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Summary findings
ValdEs-Prieto  offers  a framework for an international  piggybacks  of the collection of federal incomc tax A
comparison  of charges  in mandatory and private pension  mandatory pension system  could be used as a base for
systems,  and in state-run and privately  managed  systems.  organizing  othcr services,  such as mandatory health care
Such comparisons  make it possible  to determine  which  contributions and widely based income  taxes, at a low
combinations  of quality and cost make the most sense  in  marginal  cost
pension services.  * In the United States, there is no reliable  information
He finds that:  on the cost of the active-life  portion of social security.
* Charges in the private annuity industry are much  *  Chilean AFPs  (Administradoras  de Fondos de
higher than other components of the pension package,  Pensiones)  charge slightly  more for the active life portion
and much higher than publidy provided annuities in the  of pension services  than the international average  for
United States.  similar  services,  but appear to offer better quality  service.
* Comparing  the collection function in different  *  Marketing costs for Chilean AFPs  - which arise
countries is difficult. In Chile,  Malaysia, and Zambia, the  because  of workers freedom  to select providers  - were
pension system must collect contributions on its own. In  just 26 percent of lifetime  charges in 1991.
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This  paper  offers  a  simple  framework  to  guide  international
comparisons  of  administrative  charges  in  pension  systems.  It  also  presents
empirical  evidence  on  the  administrative  charges  in  the  Chilean  mandatory
pension  system,  the charges  and  costs  of  private  and  public  pension  systems
in  the  United  States, and  the  state-rmn pensions in  Malaysia and  Zambia.
The  overall  efficiency  of  a  pension  system  cannot  be  assessed  by  a
comparison  of  administrative  charges.  This  is  because  efficiency  should
relate  the  quality  of  a  service  to  the  charges  paid,  and  quality  varies
enormously  - maybe  more  than  charges  - across  different  pension  systems.
To  illustrate  the  obvious,  it  may  be  true  that  the  Russian  banking  system
charges  less  than  the  American  one.  but  the  time  a  transcontinental  check
takes to clear  may be 50  times  longer in the former.
An  unbiased  way  to  report  on  comparative  costs  is  to  report
simultaneously charges  and  quality  indices.  This  paper  fails  to  report  quality
indices  because  of  lack  of  data,  and  should  be  thought  of  as  a  modest
stepping-stone  towards  that  end.
The  principal  dimension  of  quality  in  pension  provision  is  the
probability  that  a  pension  with  appropriate  purchasing  -power  will  be
delivered  as  promised,  and  its  real  value  maintained  thereafter.  Among  the
factors  that influence  this  risk,  the  most  critical  is  the  overall  design  of  the
pension  system.  In  state-run,  PAYG-financed pension  systems  in  developing
countries,  the  experience  of  default  is  dominant.  In  these  cases,  the  quality
of  pensions  services  received  is  so  low  that  any  administrative  charge
appears  burdensome.  Even  in  the  OECD  many  people  trust  more  the
retirement  income  they  are  being  promised  by  their  occupational  pension
plans  than  che  promises  from  the  state-run  social  security  system,
regardless  of  the  fact  that  reported  administrative  charges  are  several  times
higher  in  the  former.
Quality  and  mistakes  in  cost  reporting  come  in  many  forms.  Consider
why  bigemployers  in  the  United  States  have  never  sought  to  contract  out
pension  administration  with  the  Social  Security  Administration  to  take
advantage  of  its  reported  low  costs.  The  reason  is  twofold:  first,  the  true
collection  costs  are  as  low  as  their  own,  because  employers  can  transfer
funds to  the IRS at  the same cost  as  to  their pension fund. Second, many US
employers  are  willing  to  absorb  the  administrative  costs  of  the  benefit
portion  of  their  private  pension  systems, even  though in  the  case  of  definedbenefit  plans  they  have  been  several  times  larger  than  those  reported  by
the  Social  Security  Administration,  because  it  is  unable  to  provide  the
security  afforded  by  funded  benefits.
Other important dimensions of  quality  of  service are correct  answers to
personal  queries,  the  volume  and  design  of  information  provided,  the
reliability  of  payment of  pensions, the  investment risk  that  must  be  borne
by  the  worker-pensioner,  the  expected  loses  due  to  embezzlement  by
service providers, etceteras. To  make up  for  the  paucity  of  data  on  quality,
we  attempt a  description of  the  services offered by  each one of  the  pension
systems  discussed  here.  The  variations  in  the  portfolio  of  services  offered
and  their  quality  are  extremely  large,  and  have  substantial  beanng  on
average  administrative  charges.
This  paper  devotes  substantial  space  to  the  Chilean  pension  system,
since  it  appears  as  an  attractive  option  in  current  discussions  of  pension
reform.  Its  attractiveness  can  be  thought  of  as  a  high  perceived  quality,
including substantial insulation from political  pressures, high  ability to  reach
the  rate  of  return  available  in  the  country,  high  degree  of  funding  and
outstanding quality of  service. Although we  do  not  attempt to  measure these
qualities,  we  ask  whether the  administrative charges  are  also  higher  than  in
pension systems that  seem to  offer  less quality.  If  they were  not,  we  would
be  in  the  presence  of  an  unusually rare  combination. The  evidence  in  this
paper suggests that  administrative charges  in  the  new Chilean system are  in
an intermediate range of costs.  On the other hand, Chilean costs appear to be
higher than  in  the  state-run system in  Malaysia, which offers  lower  quality
services but  still  much better than Zambia.
Our  study  does  not  consider the  costs  incurred  by  employers, who  are
used as collection  agencies for  the government. One  study that  attempted to
measure employers' costs  through a  survey was  Beveridge's for  England'.  He
found  that these  costs  were  around 20% of  explicit  administrative costs,  but
his  survey was restricted to  firms with more than 2,200 employees. It  is  not
surprising  that  over  history,  consideration  of  administrative  cost  for
employers  affected  the  evolution  of  the  public  mandatory  pension  system.
In  the  US,  coverage  under  the  social  security  retirement  system  was
restricted  to  industrial  wage  earners  until  the  1950's  because  the
administration  cost  of  payroll  tax  collection  and  related  record-keeping  in
small  establishments  and  among  the  self-employed  was  felt  to  be
prohibitive  (Parsons,  1992). For  the  same  reason,  firms  with  less  than  30
workers in  Bolivia  are currently  exempted from  contributing.
1  Beveridge, W. (1942). Appendix E, pages  284 and 285 and Table  XL.-3-
These  costs  may  be  even  more  important  when  assessing  the  relative
advantages  of  joint  collection  of  taxes  and  mandatory  social  security
contributions,  as  compared  to  separate  collection.
A  final  aspect  to  be  stressed is  that  we  provide  data  on  actual  pension
systems,  without  optimizing  them  first.  It  is  possible  that  the  ranking  of
administrative  charges  reported  here  may  be  reversed  if  each  pension
system  is  reformed  appropriately.  This  may  be  particularly  important  for
younger  and  more  innovative  pension  systems  like  the  Chilean  one,  where
there  has  been  much  less  time  for  learning  and  substantial  scope  is  left  to
improve  the  system.
2.  The  Appropriate  Cost  Concepts
This  section  discusses  several  aspects  that  complicate  international
comparisons  of  administrative  charges.  We  outline  preliminary
considerations  and  then  stress  three  topics:  reasons  for  international
differences, the  appropTiate cost  ratio  and  the  factor  composition of  costs.
Preliminary  considerations
The  first  important  distinction  is  between  administrative  charges  and
administrative  costs.  In  state-managed  pension  systems, . they  can  differ
because  of  sizable  implicit  subsidies  and  taxes.  For  example,  in  many
countries  the  pension  agency  does  not  have  to  pay  rent  for  its  premises,- or
can  share  the  computers  of  a  different  branch  of  government  without
paying  rent.  Mail  and  other  communication  may  be  charged  a  preferential
rate  by  the state  mail  or  telephone monopoly.
In  privately-managed  pension  systems,  charges  and  costs  diverge
because of  indirect  txes  and  profit margins.  Indirect  taxes  like VAT  may be
lower  than  those  applying to  other  firms,  as  in  Chile. Profit  margins in  turn
may  be  a  normal  remuneration of  capital,  considering risk,  or  different  from
normal,  depending  of  market  conditions.
Of  course,  implicit  subsidies  and  profits  are  notoriously  difficult  to
measure.
The  quality  of  service is  very different  across  countries. For  example, in
Chile  under  its  old  system,  in  1950-80,  the  delay  for  obtaining  a  pension
upon  compliance  with  the  age  requirement  was  so  large  than  an  industry  of
"pension  advisors"  emerged.  They  specialized  in  pushing  the  paperwork  in4 -
the  pension  administration  bureaus.  In  fact,  many  of  these  bureaucrats
receive  very  low  explicit  salaries  and  are  compensated through  substantial
income  from  bribes.  In  turn  bribes  are  paid  by  the  worker who  wants  a
pension.  In  such  a  pension  system,  it  may  appear  as  if  the  pension
administration had  very  low  costs,  because it  employs people  full  time  for
very  low  explicit  wages.  This  ignores  that  total  charges  on  the  pensioner
include  payments  to  a  pension advisor which  in  turn  pays  the  bribes. The
risk  that  the .pension  record  may  remain  lost  until  a  ransom  is  paid  is
present  in  basket cases.
Total  charges  should  include  the  cost  of  time  spent  by  the  pensioner
seeking an  advisor or  pushing paperwork himself. One would also expect the
generalized price"  or  total charges in  a  pension system with low  quality of
service  to  be  higher  than  in  a  system  with  speedy  attention,  although the
second may appear as  more expensive in  the surface.
Economic Reasons for  international differences
We  expect  administrative  charges  to  be  different. across  countries  for
three  reasons;
a)  There  may  be  a  minimum efficient  scale  in  pension  administration.
Smaller countries should exhibit higher charges for  this reason  alone.
b)  International differences  in  the  size  distribution  of  firms  are  large,
and  they  are  associated with  different cost  levels  in  pensiop  administration.
For example, in  the U.S., 62.1%  of the non-farm civilian labor force worked
in  firms  with  100  or  more  employees in  1988  (EBRI,  1992,  page  69).  In
Chilean  industry,  which  excludes  the  service  sector,  in  1983  only  42.6%
(SERCOTEC 1984, Table  1.1) of the labor force worked in  firms of that size.
The  difference  is  much  larger  for  poor  developing  countries.  It  is  a  well
established  empirical  fact  in  the  United  States  that  smaller  firms  must  pay
higher  average  administrative. charges  per  worker,  so  we  expect  the  same
correlation  to  hold  across  countries. The importance  of  costs  related  to  the
average  size  of  firm  may  be  inferred from  the  experience  of  multiemployer
pension  plans  in  the  US:  total  costs  increase  15%  when  the  number  of
member  firms. double,  keeping  constant  the  number  of  workers  (Parsons,
1992).
c)  The  volume  of  flows  of  workers between  the  formal  (covered) and
informal  sectors,  and  in  and  out  of  the  labor  force,  generate  large
administrative cost  differences.  In  countries  with  low  coverage  the  pension
system  must  incur  in  substantial  administrative costs  because  records  must
be kept  for  every past  participant to  determine benefits, even if  the  share of.5-
inactive  accounts  is  very  large.  If  these  records  are  not  kept,  evasion
becomes rampant. Therefore,  a  higher share  of  informal  labor  implies  higher
administrative  charges.
Another  way  of  expressing  these  differences  is  that  the  mix of  services
provided  by  a  pension  system  must  change  as  the  structure  of  the  labor
market  changes.  For  example,  the  substantial  flows  of  workers  between  the
formal  and  informal  sectors,  and  in  and  out  of  the  labor  force,  must  be
squared  with  the  need  to  define  some  minimum  residence  penod  before
insurance coverage  is  granted.  Many  workers do  not  meet  it  and  receive  a
reduced  --  frequently  zero  --level  of  services.  The  result  is  that  the  mix  of
services  - for  example,  -old  age  pensions  versus  disability  - varies
substantially  across  countries.  These  differences  help  to  explain  large
variations  in  administrative  charges.
The  appropriate  cost  ratio
Once a figure for total charges is  found, it  is  usually presented as  a ratio.
Typical  candidates  for  the  denominator  are  the  volume  of  pension  assets,
the  volume  of  contributions  or  pension  benefits,  the  volume  of  covered
wages  and  the  number  of  covered  workers.  Each  ratio  emphasizes  a
different  aspect  of  charges,  but  has  important defects.
Pension  assets  have  the  defect  that  published  government  statistics
exclude  the  value  of  outstanding  pension  entitlements  (liabilities),  so  PAYG-
financed  systems appear  as  lacking  assets.  On  the  other  h&d,  most  pension
systems  in  the  world  have  not  achieved  maturity,  in  the  sense  that  citizens
of  al  ages  are  participating  to  the  same degree  in  the  pension  system. This
reduces  pension  assets  by  more  than  administrative  costs,  so  biases  emerge.
This  measure  also  tends  to  present  countries  where  the  working  population
is  older,  closer  to  retirement,  or  where  the  informal  sector  is  larger,  as  less
costly  in  administrative charges.  Finally, pension assets  tend  to  be  higher in
countries  with  higher  contribution  rates,  diluting  administrative  charges  as
discussed  below.  In  the  end,  these  biases  make  appear  developing  country
pension  systems as  mare  costly.
The  ratio  of  administrative  charges  to  the  flow  of  contributions  or
pensions  is  also  misleading  because  contribution  rates  vary  enormously
across  countries,  from  2%  in  Iceland  to  40%  in  Singapore.  They  also  vary
substantially  over  time  in  a  given  country.  Usually  these  changes
overwhelm  changes  in  administrative  charges.  As  developing  countries  tend
to  have  lower  contribution  rates  because  of'  their  youth  or  because  of  a
higher  rate  of  return  on  investments,  and  they  have  lower  coverage  rates,
their  administrative  charges  appear  as  excessive  when  this  ratio  is  used.-6-
For  example,  this  measure  understates  the  administrative  cost  of  high-
contribution-rate  PAYG-financed  pension  systems  like  those  in  continental
Europe  and  overstate  administrative  costs  in  low-rate  countries  in  Africa.
This  ratio  also  overstate  costs  of  funded  versus  unfunded  pensions,  because
the  former  earn  hig'lier rates  of  return  in  the  steady  state  and  therefore
need  a  smaller  contribution rate  to  pay  the  same  benefits.
Reporting  administrative charges  as  a  share  of  covered  wages  is  suspect
because  of  two  reasons:  (a)  Administrative costs  tend  to  be  flat  per  person.
Managing  accounts for  a  worker is  not  proportional  to  the  number  of  zeros
in  her  paycheck.  Individual  country  time  series  show  that  a  substantial
share  of  administrative  costs  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  effective
covered  workers served,  not  to  the  volume  of  funds  or  the  level  of  covered
wages.  It  is  possible  that  the  quality  of  labor  needed  to  operate  pension
systems  varies  much  less  across  countries  than  per-capita  income,  for  a
given, quality  of  pensions  offered;  and  (b)  Covered  wages  are  subject  to
significant  under  reporting  in  many  countries.  In  most  cases  independent
workers are  free to  declare any  wage  they  wish  to  cover.  These workers are
dominant  -in  labor  markets  in  developing  countries.  Covered  wages  are  a
notoriously  slippery  concept  in  countries  with  large  informal  labor  markets.
Both  problems  imply  that  measures  of  cost  that  divide  total  cost  by  the
volume  of  covered  wages,  or  by  per-capita  income,  are  misleading.  They
exaggerate  the  degree  to  which  developing  country  pension  systems  are
more  costly.
Because  of  these  problems,  we  report  administrative  charges  per
covered  worker.  However,  this  also  has  defects,  which  the  reader  should
keep  in  mind:
a)  This  is  a  money measure,  so  an  international comparison requires  the
use  of  exchange  rates.  The  difference  between  PPP  exchange  rates  and
market  exchange  rates  can  be  substantial,  as  reported  in  the  Economics
literature.  In  this  case the  bias  is  in  favor  of developing countres  because in
most  of  them  the  market  exchange  rate  is  more  depreciated  than  the  PPP
rate.
b)  The  number  of  effectively  covered  workers is  difficult  to  pin  down
when  the  degree  of  coverage  is  limited.  In  developing  countries  there  is  a
large  difference  between  the  number  of  persons  who  contribute  in  one
month,  the  number  of  persons  that  are  covered  by  disability  insurance  and
the  number  of  persons  that  have  contributed  at  least  once  in  their  lifetime.
We  introduce  the  concept  of  "effective  covered  worker"-  an  intermediate
number  explained  below  - to  approach  this  problem.The factor composition of costs
In  a cost  function approach, observed total cost  would be:
Total Cost =  f(output levels, factor prices)
In  turn,  output  levels  include  at  least  the  number  of  workers  who
receive  collection  and  record-keeping  services,  the  insurance  coverage
produced,  and  the  volume  of  pension  fund  management  services.  Finally;
charges  would  be  determined  from  costs  and  the  factors  that  determine
profit  margins,  such  as  market  structure,  barriers  to  entry,  the  degree  of
product  differentiation  and  conduct.
It  is  useful  to  discuss briefly  how total  costs  depend of  different pieces
of  the pension  services package.
Investment  management costs  are  less  than  proportional  to  wealth  and
income because there  are economies of  scale in  some of  these  services. This
is  shown  by  costs  studies  of  the  mutual  fund  management industry  in  the
U.S., which find  cost-  assets elasticities between 0.423 and  0.871  (Baumol et
al, page 187)
More  importantly,  investment management costs  depend  of  the  type  of
portfolio  held.  They are  very  low in  Malaysia, where 78% of  the  funds  are
held  in  specially-issued  treasury  securities  and  10% is  held  in  short  term
notes  issued  by  local  banks,  several  of  which  are  state-owned.  Investment
management costs  have  been  small  in  Chile,  where  investment  regulations
have  limited  asset  choice.  In  March  1992  Chilean  pension  fund  managers
could  choose  only  among  48  equities,  38  corporate  bonds  and  37  bank
issuers.  In  the  United  States,  where  asset  choice  is -very  wide,  investment
management  costs  are  large.  However  even  in  this  case  investment
management  costs  are  less  than  a  quarter  of  total  costs  (see  evidence  in
Table  8).  The  tendency  towards  indexed  funds  and  other  types  of  passive
management  should  counteract  the  higher  costs  due  to  the  tendency
towards  global  investment,  suggesting  that  investment  management  costs
will  remain  secondary.
Equipment  costs  and  working  capital  costs  are  not  dominant  in  the
pension  administration  industry,  as  seen  in  the  relatively  low  value  of
directly-owned assets.  For example, based on  1991 accounting data  for  fixed
and  circulating  assets,  the  three  largest  Chilean  pension  fund  managers
needed  an  average  of  4.75  dollars  per  contributor  per  year  to  generate  a-8-
12%  annual  real  return  on  physical  assets  and  circulating  capital2. This
figure  is  between  16%  and  28%  of  the  annual  salary  expenses  on
administrative  personnel  for  these  firms.
The  price  of  tradeable  physical  equipment  may  seem  to  be  similar  in
developing  and  in  developed  countries,  since  computer  and
telecommunications  equipment  is  manufactured  on  a  worldwide  basis.
However, other  factors  suggest  that  these  costs  may  be  larger  in  developing
countries,  because  of  larger  transport  costs,  larger  customs  duties,  and  less
competition  in  distribution  leading  to  higher  profit  margins  there.  As
importantly, service  is  more expensive  and  less  reliable,  raising  the  cost  per
unit  of  computing  services.
On  the  other  hand,  office  buildings  should  exhibit  lower  costs  in
developing  countries  because  of  the  lower  wages  earned  by  construction
workers.  However,  this  effect  must  be  corrected  by  the  fact  that  such
workers  also  exhibit  low  productivity.  Regarding  the  opportunity  costs  of
capital, the conventional wisdom is  that  it  is  higher in  developing countres.
Regarding administrative  costs,  the  wage  levels  of  personnel  needed  to
run  a  pension  system  may  exhibit  less  international  variation  than  average
income  levels.  This  is  because  the  abilities  needed  to  perform  these  tasks
seem  to  be  in  more  ample supply  in  developed than  in  developing countries.
This  hypothesis  is  not  contradicted  in  the  country  evidence presented in  this
study, except  for  the  case  of  the  United  States,  which pays  high  salaries  to
workers in  the  Social  Security  Administration.
Some  costs  depend  of  the  contribution  rate  itself.  The  costs  associated
with  insurance  and  fund  management  are  applied  to  a  larger  volume  of
funds  when the  contribution- rate  is  larger.
In  the  retirement  phase  of  the  pension  life'  cycle,  services  can  be
provided  by  insurance  companies.  These  are  costs  that  appear  to  be  highly
correlated  with  income  levels.  The  margin  charged  by  insuranCe companies
and  the  fees  charged  by  insurance  brokers  are  usually  expressed  as  a
fraction  of  the  insurance  premium.  We  provide  data  below  that  suggests
that  these premium  is  quite  similar  in  the  United  States  and  Chile,  although
average income  levels  in  the  United  States  is  four  times  Chile's  at  current
exchange rates.  The reason  for  this  appear  to  be  two-fold:  (a)  the  value  of
2  This  figure was obtained from  the  balance sheets of  Provida,  Santa Marfa and  Habitua for  the
-year ended December .31,  1991, after.,  substracting Negotiable Securities  and .Other  Circulating
-Assets. The  resulting  asset  value is  divided  by, the  number  of. contributors  in  March  1992,
multiplied by  0.12 and  the result reduced to  US dollars at  the December exchange rate  of  Ch.S
374.51. The result is  lowest for Provida (3.54) and  highest for  Habitat (6.56).-9-
the  investment guarantees provided by  the  shareholders of  the  insurance
companies  is a proportion  of the premium;  and (b) brokerage  fees tend to be
a  proportion of the value of  the asset that changes hand - in this case one
insurance premium - because the benefits obtained from the  broker's effort
are proportional to the value of the asset.
-In conclusion, the  evidence suggests that  administrative charges are
closer.  to being,  a fixed cost per affiliate than being a multiple of local wages
levels. This does not deny that significant components of  total costs are  a
function of other variables such as pension assets.
3.  Charges  and  services  in  Chile
This  section  discusses  the  level  of  charges  and  the  types  of  services
obtained  by  Chilean  contributors  in  exchange  in  the  new  pension  system
that  started in  1981. We present  first  the charges during  active life  and  then
move  on  to  present  c;xarges during  retirement.  In  this  discussion  it  should
be noted that there are two major classes of providers of pension services in
Chile:  Pension  Fund  Managers  (in  Spanish,  Administradoras  de  Fondos  de
Pensiones, AFPs) and Life  Insurance Companies. AFPs provide services to all
active  workers  and  to  a  part  of  retirees.  Life  insurance  companies  provide
annuities  to  part  of  the  retirees.
Payments  by  different  types  of  active  contributors- :o  the  pension
system, including commissions, are the  following:
Table  1
Payments to  the  Chilean Pension  System  while  Active
Type  of  Registered Person  Payments to  Pension  System
(% of  covered wage)
Active  Dependent  Worker  12.94%
Active  Independent  Worker:
a) Contributor  12.94%  of  declared income
b) Non contributor  zero
Out of  the  formal labor  force,
but not retired:  zero
Source:  SAFP  Bulletin.  Data  for  September  1992. Total  payments is  the  sum  of  10%
explicit  contribution plus  the  average  of  the  so  called  "additional"  fee.  which  provides
insurance  for  invalidity  and  survivorship  and  includes  most  of  AFP's  commission
income. The other  fees  are  not  deducted from salary.-10-
As  in  the  Netherlands  since  1974,  so  called  "employer  contributions"  do
not  exist  in  Chile  since  1981  in  order  to  maximize  worker  awareness  of  the
fact  that  funds  contributed  are  their  own  individual  property.  As  always,
employers  pay  labor  costs  inclusive  of  "employee  contributions".
Chilean  contributors  receive  two  types  of  benefits  in  exchange  of
contributions,  cash  benefits  and  other  services,  in  exchange  for  fees.  We
discuss  cash  benefits  first.  In  a  pension  system  with  a  given  contribution
rate,  benefits  are  determined  by  the  rate  of  return  obtained  by  the  pension
funds.  In  the  Chilean  -case,  these  have  been  much  higher  than  expected,  as
shown  in  the  next  table,  suggesting  that  the  quality  of  service  was  very
high.
Table  2
Real Razes of  '7eturn in  Chilean Pension Fund
(  %  per  year.  above CPI inflation)
Year  Return  Year  Return  Year  Return.
1981*  12.9 %  1985  13.4 %  1989  6.9 %
1982  28.5 %  1986  12.3 %  1990  15.6 %
1983  21.2 %  1987  5.4 %  1991  29.7 %
19B4  3.6 %  1988  6.5 %  1992  5.2 %
:  Only July to  December. because AFPs started operations in  may 1.  1981.
Source:  Boletin  Superintendencia  AFPs.
However,  these  high  returns  were  due  mostly  to  high  returns  generally
in  Chile.  It  is  more  meaningful  to  measure  the  quality  of  investment  services
by  the  difference  between  actual  returns  and  potential  returns  at  the  same
level  of  risk.  In  the  Chilean  case  this  difference  has  been  remarkably  small,
as  shown  in  econometric  work  by  Walker  (1991).  In  other  words,  Chilean
workers  were  able  to  sbare  in  booming  bond  and  stock  markets  in  Chile
during  the  1980's.  This  is  much  better  than  the  large  negative  differences
observed  in  many  state-managed  pension  systems.
We  discuss  now  other  services.  The  five  main  services  provided  by
AFPs to. active  workers  a..bnle  are.3
a)  Collection  Services.  This  means  receiving  contributions  every  month,
crediting  it  to  the  correct  individual  account,  pursuing  mismatches  and
3  The  services provided by  insurance companies and  insurance brokers are  discussed below.putting  pressure  on  the  employer  if  the  contributions  are  not  paid  at  the
appropriate  time.
b)  Insurance  and  Guarantees.  For  active  workers,  insurance  refers  to
invalidity  and  survivorship.  This  service  is  packaged  with  the  rest,  so  the
administrative  costs  associated  to  invalidity  cannot  be  separated.
c)  Individual  Accounts.  Credits  and  debits  have- to  be  allocated  to
individual  accounts.  .his  includes  a  personal  financial  statement  sent  every
four  months  to  each  contributor, and  once  a  year  to  affiliates  that  have  not
contributed  for  12  months.  The  statement  indicates  the  amounts  received
from  the  employer,  the  return  obtained,  the  commissions  charged  and  the
new  outstanding  balance.
d)  Personal  Information.  AFP  staff  answers  customer  questions
regarding  accumulation  rules,  alternative  ways  of  obtaining  a  pension,  and
rules  governing  insurance  coverage.  This  service  is  important  in  Chile
because  of  three  reasons:  (i)  several  important  decisions  are  left  to
individual  choice,  so  individuals  tend  to  inquire  frequently;  (ii)  the  Chilean
pension  system was reformed  in  1981 and  learning  is  still  going  on;  and  (iii)
the  law  that  governs  is  under  continual  improvement.  Some  informal
estimates  by  AFP  industry  experts  suggests  that  a  large  share  of  branch
personnel is  devoted  to  perform  this  service.
e)  Fund  Management.  One  measure  of  this  service  wold  be  the
difference  between  the  rate  of  return  obtained  in  the  AFPP  and  the  one  that
could  be  obtained  in  the  simplest  savings  account,  after  correcting  for
differences in risk,  the  value of  queuing time  and other  aspects. 4
Chilean  AFPs  provide  three  non-pension  services,  free  of  additional
charge:
a)  Starting  in  January  1988.  contributors  were  allowed  to  open  a
voluntary  savings  account  in  their  AFP.  The  only  requirement  is  to  have
contributed  for  one  month  into  the  retirement  account.  This  savings  account
is  similar  to  those  offered  by  mutual  funds  in  other  countries.  Up  to  four
withdrawals  per  year  are  allowed.  In  March-  1992  there  were  453,608
voluntary  savings  accounts  in  the  AFP  system,  which  is  10.7%  of  the
mandatory  accounts  of  all  registered  persons.  During  that  month  there  were
278,584  deposits  and  60,862  withdrawals,  and  the  average  balance  at  the
end  of  the month was 572.8  dollars.
4  It  should also be  taken into account that low-income workers are usually restricted  by minimum
amount requrement  on deposits imposed by banks. These restrictions are not  alowed  to  AFPs.-1  2-
b)  Starting  in  January  1991,  two  subsets  of  contributors  were  required
to  open  another  account  with  their  AFPs  to  comply  with  new  labor
legislation.  One  group  is  comprised  of  workers  who  agree  with  their
employers  on  severance  payments  payable  upon  termination  regardless  of
motive, if  the  agreed  amount is  larger  than  7  months  worth  of wages.  After
the  seventh .year  of  employment,  the  employer  must  put  aside  one  more
salary  per  year  for  severance  payment  purposes.  This  amount  has  to  be
deposited  by  the  employer  in  a  special  severance  account  in  an  AFP.  The
AFP can pay it  to  the worker as  a lump sum only  after the worker shows he
has  been  terminated.
The  second  group  is  that  of  in-house  maids,  whose  employer  must
contribute  every  month  4.11%  of  salary  into  a  severance  account  managed
by  an  AFP. In October  1992 there were  234,090 severance accounts in  Chile,
with an  average balance  of  34.0 dollars.
c)  Determination  and  payment  of  redistributive  pension  top-ups  for  the
poor  old.  The  Chilean- government alleviates poverty  in  old  age  through  two
mechanisms.  One  is  a  means-tested  program  administered;  by  the
municipalities. The second is  administered at  no  charge  by  the AFPs and  life
insurance  companies.  They  compare  every  month-  the  pension  and  the
legislated  minimum  pension,  for  each  worker.  AFPs  and  life  insurance
companies  top  up  the  pensions  that  are  below  the  minimum  and  obtain  a
refund  from  the  Treasury.
Although AFPs  are  allowed to  charge  for  these  services (except  for  the
last  one),  up  to- now  they  have  charged  nothing,  subsidizing them  from  the
pension  system's  commission revenue.  It  is  not  clear  that  this  is  sustainable
in  the long run,  so commissions on these accounts  -may  become positive.
Pensioned  workers  receilve services  from  either  AFPs  or  life  insurance
companies, depending  of  the -pension option they  choose.  If  they  choose  an
annuity (indexed to  the  CPI),  the life  insurance company offers  the following
services:
a)  longevity  insurance  for  the  pensioner and  widow.
b)  survivorship  insurance  for  spouse  and  dependent  children;
c)  a  financial  guarantee  of  investment returns.
d)  a  guarantee regarding the  outcome of  the  life  table.- 13-
e)  payment  services,  meaning  prompt  delivery  and  accurate  calculation
of  the  monthly  pension  amount.
If  a  pensioner  chooses  the  programmed  withdrawal  option,  which
provides  a  monthly  pension  according-  to  a  formula  that  takes  into  account
actual  investment  returns  and  actual  longevity,  he  receives  the  following
services  from  an  AFP:
a)  investment  management
b)  survivorship  insurance  for  spouse  and  dependent  children;
c)  payment  services,  including  delivery  and  accurate  calculation  of  the
monthly  pension  amount.
d)  Record-keeping  for  individual  accounts.
e)  Answers  to  questions  about  pensioning  option.  This  is  because
programmed  with  drawal  is  a  reversible  option,  and  at  any  time  the
pensioner  can  switch  to  an  annuity.  - .
The  services  provided  by  AFPs  are  not  received  -by  all  registered
persons,  as  the  following  Table  shows.
Table  3
Pension  Services  Received  by  those  Registered
Registered  person  Services  Received
Fund  Insurance  Individual  Personal  Collection
Management  &  Guarantees  Adcounts  -nformation  &  Paym.Srv.
Active  Dependent
Worker  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Independent  Worker:
a)  Contributor  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
b)  Non contributor  YES  TEMPORARY  YES  YES  ND
Out of  the  labor force,
but  not  retired. Does
not  contribute.  YES  TEMPORARY  YES  YES  ND
Pension  recipients
a)  Programmed
Withdrawal  YES  -ND  Y  -YES  YES
b)  Annuities  ND  YES  NC  N  YES- 14-
Registered  persons  that  are  not  currently  contributing  and  therefore
are  not  currently  paying  fees,  still  receive  significant  services,  such  as
record-keeping  through  individual  accounts,  fund  management  services  and
personal  information.  This  feature  was  introduced  by  statute  in  1988,  when
a  fee  on  the  outstanding  balance  akin  to  that  observed in  the  mutual  fund
industry  was  banned.  This  implies  AFPs  must  carry  a  substantial  cross-
subsidy  going  from  steady  contributors  towards  infrequent  contributors.
.This  has  implications  for  costs,  because  it  suggests  that  to  obtain
average  costs  non-insurance  costs  should  be  divided  among  registered
persons  rather  than  among  current  contributors.  Without  this  correction,
international  comparisons  among  countries  with  different  degrees  of  service
to  non-contributing affiliates  would be  misleading. For example,  in  a  country
where  only  x%  of  the  work  force  contributes  every  month,  and  where job
rotation  between  the  covered  and  uncovered  segment  is  such  that  all
workers pass  through  the  covered  sector  at  least  once  in  their  working  life,
then  we  would  expect  the  ratio  of  registered  persons  to  contributors  to  be
close  to  (1/x)  in  the  steady  state.  Total  cost  per  registered  person,  which
measures  services  rendered,  including  individual  accounts  and  fund
management services,  would  then  be  only  x%  of  total  cost  per  contributor,
which  measures  services  charged-
On  the  other  hand,  basing  all  calculations  on  registered  persons  is  not
appropriate  because  collection  services  are  provided  to  contributors  only.
The  long  run  average  cost  of  serving  a  steady  contributor" must  be  larger
than  the  cost  of  serving an  infrequent contributor. Because  of  the  absence of
more  information  about the  cost  structure,  we  will  present  data  on  the  basis
of  the  number  of  registered  persons  that  paid  at  least  one  contribution  in
the  last  12  months.
We  define  the  number  of  "effectively covered  contributors"  as  the  78%
of  registered  persons  making  at  least  one  contribution  in  the  last  12
months 5 . The  cutoff  at  12  months  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the
invalidity  and  survivors  insurance  covers  unemployed  workers  for  up  to  12
months  after  termination.  There  were  3.280  million  effective  covered
workers  in  the  AFP  system  in  March  1992. Total  registered  persons  were
4.226  million  and  total  active contributors were  2.549 million  in  that  month.
S  In  March  1992. 54.3  %  of  non-pensioned affiliates  were  credited a  monthly contribution and
25.9 % had not received a credit during the last 12 months. However,  as 6.2% of affiliates made a
contribution but  had not  been credited by the  end of the  month because of administrative delay,
we will prorate this number among the 4517% who was not  credited by the end of the month. We
get a  figure of 22A5%  of affiliates not  being credited in the last 12 months.- 5-
Average  charges
The  charges  in  the  Chilean  pension  system  are  the  sum  of  the
commission  incomes  of  AFPs  during  active  life,  and  of  life  insurance
companies,  assuming  the  affiliate  chooses  annuities  upon  retirement.  Each
one  has  special  features that  must  be  taken into  account.
In  the case  of  AFPs, it  is  necessary to  separate  AFP income devoted  to
pay  insurance  benefits  for  invalidity  and  survivorship.  Most  of  these  funds
are  returned  to  workers  in  the  form  of  invalidity  and  survivorship
insurance  payments,  just  as  old-age  pension  payments,  and  are  not
administrative  charges.  Still,  AFPs  and  their  reinsurers  charge  some
commissions in  this  business, which must  be  taken  into account.
From  the  financial  statements  of  AFPs  in  1991,  we  get  a  total
commission income of  92.208  billion pesos.  Of  this,  28.800 bilion  pesos  was
spent  in  buying  group  invalidity  and  survivorship  insurance  for  the
affiliates.  Therefore,  the  net  cost  for  affiliates  was  63.408  billion  pesos,  or
169.3  million  dollars.  Dividing  by  3.282  million  effective  contributors  and
using  the  market  exchange  rate  as  of  March  1992,  we  obtain  an  average
annual  charge  of  51.6  dollars  per  effective  contributor.  We  will  see  below
that  most  of  this  is  used up  in collection  costs.  The costs  of  paying  benefits
are  not  significant because of  the  low  average age  in  the  AFP  system: there
were  just  91,328  registered  persons  that  were  pensioned  as  of  March  1993.
The  Chilean  AFP  industry  had  4,566  employees,  3,439  salespeople  and
close  to  450  branch  offices  in  December  1990.  The  average  compensation
per  AFP  worker,  obtained  from  income  and  loss  statements  for  1991,  was
10,878  dollars  per  administrative  employee  and  7,273  dollars  per
salesperson 6. These employees are near  the top  of  the  labor  market, as  seen
when  comparing  with  the  average  covered  wage,  which  was  3,900  dollars
per  year  in  1991.
As  explained  there  is  an  additional  charge  upon  disability  and
survivorship  insurance.  This  charge  is  divided  up  between  reinsurance
companies  and  AFPs.  Valdes-Pricto  and  Navarro  (1992)  estimated
econometrically  that  the  back-payments  to  workers  amounted  to  0.84%  of
6  Source: 1990 wage  expenses from the  income and  loss  smtements of  AFPs and  the number of
workers, both  reported  by  Habitat  (1991),  and  then  corrected by  the  variation of  the  general
wage index from December 1990 to  March 1992.  The variation of  the genel  wage index and the
average covered salary for  March 1992 were  taken from Bulletin No.  110, Superintendency of
AFP.- 16-
gross  wages  in  1987-1 990.7  On  the  other  hand,  the  Superintendency  of
AFPs  published  a  weighted  average  of  the  initial  prices  paid  by  AFPs  in
these  insurance  contracts.  This  was  1.06%  of  covered  wages  for  June  1992,
which  should  be  close  to  the  28.800  billion  pesos  spent  buying  group
invalidity  and  survivorship  insurance  for  the  affiliates.  Taken  literally,  these
numbers  suggest  that  a  charge  of  0.22%  of  covered  wages  is  present.
Multiplying  by  an  average  contribution  of  25.0  dollars  per  month  per
effective  contributor  (which  is  discussed  in  more  detail  below),  we  obtain  an
additional  charge  of  6.7  dollars  per  year  in  invalidity  and  survivors
insurance  per  effective  contributor.
The  Structure  of  actual  Charges  by  AFPs
We  present  also  the  charges  actually  seen  by  the  user  of  the  AFP
system.  In -the  Chilean  pension  system  there  have  been  three  types  of
commissions  allowed  since  its  inception  in  1980.  One  of  them  was  prohibited
by  law  in  January  1988.  Their  average  annual  levels  are  summarized  in
Table  3:
Table  4
Average  Commissions Charged by  Private  Pension  Fund
Managers in  Chile  to  Dependent Workers that  Coneribute, 1987-1992
*Tyne  of  co  Tmission  Ztal
(A)  (B)  (C)  (A+  B+ C)
Monthly  "Additional"  "Percentage"  (Total Cost for
Year  Lump  sum  (% of  taxable  (annual  %  of  Average  affiliate*
(Ch.S of Dec. 1990)  salary)  outsL balance )  (%.of  tax.  salary)
1987  324  3.39  0.33  4.06
1988  356  3.56  - 3.93
1989  245  3.25  3.48
1990  189  2.99  3.22
Sept  1992  128  2.94  3.09
Average affiiatc  is  a  contributor  defined w have a  monthly taxable income of  Ch.S 84.500 (12
U.F.) which is  the average of the system for  1990.  He has  an  outstanding balance derived from a
10% contribution rate, continuous participation since the beginning of  the  system  and  no growth
in  the real  wage. The  increase in  the  outstanding balance does't  influence total cost  since  1988.
when that conmission was banned.
Sources: Habitat  (1991) up to  1990. averaging AFPs according to  their  number of  affiliates; For
September 1992, SAFP Bulletin N'  110 for  September 1992  averaging AFPs according to  their
number of  contributors in  March  1992.
7  This  is  confirmed with  a  different  method. The  ratio  of  premium paid  for  reinsurance of  the
invalidity and  survivors' risk  to  commission income in  1991. was 31.23  %.  Therefore. applying
this to  the 3.09% commrion  ra,  we get 0.965 % for insuran  premia. not  far from the 0.84%.
These costs are expected to at least double as the work force ages.- 17 -
Considering  the  total  commissions  cost  reported  in  Table  3,  the  cost  of
the  pension  system  to  a  Chilean  worker  that  contributes  continuously  while
active  was 3.09  - 0.84  =  2.25  % of  gross  wages  in  September  1992.
The  Charges  to  Retirees
Retirees  that  choose  annuities  must  pay  fees  to  the  life  insurance
companies.  Only  about  half  of  retirees  choose  this  option.  This  is  much  more
common  among  middle  and  high-income  workers  because  the  law;  forces
workers  on  the  minimum  pension  to  stay  in  programmed  wiLthdrawal.
Retirees  that  choose  the  programmed  withdrawal  option  could  be
charged  by  AFPs,  but  they  have  never  been  in  the  12  year  history  of  the
Chilean  system.  The  costs  of  serving  those  retirees  has  been  shifted  to  active
contributors  up  to  now.  Apparently,  the  absence  of  charges  to  programmed
withdrawal  pensioners  is  due  to  the  small  number  of  them  during  the  first
years  after  the  reform,  due  to  the  fact  that  most  older  workers  remained  in
the  old  conventional  pension  system.  We  expect  that  AFPs  will  charge  for
services  to  these  pensioners  in.  the  future.  Alternatively-  charges  on  active
contributors  must  increase  in  order  to  finance  the  provision  of  services  to
increasing  numbers  of  pensioners  in  programmed  withdrawal.  However,  we
expect  those  future  charges  to  be  substantially  smaller  than  those  charged
by  life  insurance  companies  on  annuities,  because  of  two  factors:  (a)  Its
distribution  method  could  be  much  cheaper,  as  it  is  more  like  a  commodity,
and  (b)  the  fmancial  product  has  lower  quality  as  it  does'  not  include  a
guaranteed  rate  of  return.  For  now  that  cost  is  not  available.
In  order  to  be  able  to  obtain  lifetime  charges  on  workers  that  pass
through  the  annuity  option,  we  express  all  these  fees  as  if  they  were  paid
by  affiliates  while  active  (not  pensioned).  Although  in  fact  they  pay  these
fees  at  retirement,  this  can  always  be  expressed  as  a  sum  put  aside  while
'contributing  when  active,  for  the  future  payment  of  fees.
The  amount  accumulated  in  the  individual  account  is  the  result  of
contributions  of  10%  of  gross  wages,  minus  the  monthly  flat  commission,
which  is  charged  only  when  the  effective  affiliate  is  ,ontributing,  that  is
77.7%  of  the  time.  The  flat  commission  was  128  pesos  in  September  1992,
close  to  0.34  dollars  per  month.
The  average  Chilean  contributor  earned  325  US  dollars  per  month  in
March  1992.  He  or  she  adds  to  his/her  account  at  the  rate  of  [O.10x325  -
0.34]=  32.16  dollars  per  month.  As  the  average  effective  contributor*  ~~~~-  18-
contributes  only  77.7%  of  the  time  on  average,  the  average  contribution  is
only  25.0  dollars  per  month.
The  annuity option is  taken  mostly by  middle and  high  income  workers,
which  contribute  much  more  regularly  than  77.7%.  Low  income  workers
that receive the  minimum pension are  forced by  law  to  stay  in  the  AFP and
follow  the  programmed  withdrawals  option.  This  means  that  the  observed
insurance  broker  commission is  a  larger  absolute  figure  than  what  would be
expected  on  the  basis  of  the  average  contributor.  On  the  other  hand,
available  evidence  suggests  that  the  insurance  broker  commission  is
announced  by  life  insurance  companies  as  a  fixed  percentage,  regardless  of
the level  of  funds accumulated by  the  pensioner. This  suggests  that  working
with  the  average  contributor would  still  be  appropriate.
The  fee  charged  by  the  life  insurance  company  can  be  measured
indirectly  by  the  spread  between  the  rate  of  return  it  can  obtain  from
buying  20  year  fixed-income  CPI-indexed  bonds  sold  by  the  state-owned
commercial  bank  in  the  primary  market8 and  the  average  internal  rate  of
return  paid  to  new  annuitants.  This  internal  rate  of  return  is  published  by
the  Superintendency  of  Securities  and  Insurance  for  each  month  and  for
each  insurance  company.  This. rate  of  return  is  obtained  by  equating  the
premium  (the  lump  sum  that  will  buy  the  annuity  stream)  with  the
expected  present  value  of  the  annuity  stream  offered  in  the  insurance
policy, according to the official life  table.  Although there is  a  significant risk
that  the  official  Chilean  life  table  is  not  conservative  enough,  and  the  life
insurance  companies  are  aware  of  this  fact  and  factor  it  inlo  their  pricing,
we  take  the  resulting  spread  at  face  value  because  of  lack  of  additional
data.  This  spread  also  takes  into  account  that  the  bonds  and  annuities  have
a  similar financial duration, close  to  9  years 9,  at  current interest  rates.
The  data  available  shows that  the  average spread  measured in  this  way
was  1.273  %  for  the  18  months  between  August  1990  and  January  1992,
and  the  monthly  standard  deviation  of  the  spread  was  0.242  %  for  that
period1 0 (Dfaz  and  Valdes-Prieto,  1992). This  spread  includes  fees  for  the
8  Newly issued 20-year fixed income bonds pay  a  constant stream quarterly and  yield a  bit  more
than the massive issues of  Central Bank  10-year bonds and  something between 0.50 and  1.00%
less  than  12-year corporate bonds with  a  3-year  grace  period. The  term  structure  was almost
flat for  the period for which we repon  data
9  This  is  more than  life expectancy at 65, because of  early retzrement.
10  Before August  1992 the  spread  was much higher and  fluctuating, probably due  to  the  tightly
oligopolistic nature  of the  market at  that time. Later,  new entry has made the  annuities market
- much more rivalrous in  the  life  insurance company side,  while the  spread stabilized. The series
for  the  spread is:  1.35; 1.40; 1.57:  1.57; 1.37; 1.36;  1.46: 1.30;  1.47; 1.48;  1.44; 1.27; 0.90:
0.80:  1.00: 0.88:  1.07: 1.22.-19-
insurance  broker  and/or  salespeople.  This  spread  includes  both  a  charge
and  the  cost  of  the  financial  guarantee  that  enhances  the  quality  of  the
annuity.  The  financial  guarantee  is  costLy because  the  promised  return  is
real  not  nominal,  i.e.  the  annuity  amount  is  indexed  to  the  CPI.  An
interesting  question  is  how  high  is  the  probability  of  payment  by  insurance
companies  perceived  by  pensioners,  as  compared  to  the  perceived
probability  of  payment  of  state  pensions  which  are  subject  to  legislative
adjustment.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Chilean  government uses  accoundng
rules  to  enforce  solvency regulation in  this  industry.
The  observed  spread  of  1.273%  per  year  may  be  compared  to  that
reported  by  Friedman  and  Warshawsky (1990)  for  the  US.  They  report  the
difference  between  the  internal  rate  of  return  on  nominal  annuities
obtained  from  the  life  tables  for  the  population  purchasing  annuities  and
adjusted  for  projected  mortality  improvements,  and  the  nominal  yield  of
twenty-year  US  government  bonds.  Considering  the  ten  largest  insurance
companies,  the average  spread  in  1968-83 was  2.43%  per  year.
As  the  duration  of  newly issued annuities is  close  to  nine  years and  the
average  level  of  real  interest  rates  in  Chile  in  the  last  two  years  for  fixed
income  debt  of  similar  maturity  has  been  close  to  6.5%  per  year,  ihe
percentage  reduction  in  pension  benefits  originated  in  the  spread  of  1.27%
is  10.23% per  yeartl.  Applying this  to  an  average  contribution of  25  dollars
per  month  per  effective  contributor,  we  find  that  this  is  equivalent  to  a
charge of 30.8  US dollars per  year while active.
Total  charges  in  the  Chilean  system
The  total  lifetime  charges by  the Chilean pension  system on  the  average
contributor that  chooses the annuity  option is  then  51.6 +  6.7 +  30.8  = 89.1
dollars  per  year  while  active.  The  worker  that  chooses  the  programmed
withdrawal  option  will  pay  the  equivalent  of  more  than  51.6  dollars  per
year  while  active  when  AFPs  begin  to  charge  commissions  to  pensioners.
The  aggregate  amount  of  these  administrative  charges  would  be  292.2
million US dollars per year, which is 0.83% of Chilean GDP.
One  important  conclusion  is  that  65%  of  the  total  cost  is  incurred  for
services received  before  being pensioned,  while  35%  is  incurred  for  services
received  afterwards.
Although this  is  an  estimate  for  the  current  Chilean  situation, it  is  also
interesting  to  project  these  numbers  to  an  environment  where  per-capita
11 [(1.065  - 0.0127)/1.065]9  =  0.8977  =  1 - 0.1023.-20-
income  doubles.  As  the  AFP  cost  is  oriented  towards  transactions,  it  should
not  rise  substantially  by  increased  wage  levels.  The  insurance  cost,  however,
seems  to  be  proportional  to  wealth  or  income.  Therefore,  it  should  double  as
income  doubles,  taking  the  total  cost  to  51.6  +  2x6.7  +  2x30.8  =  126.6
dollars  per  year  while  active.  At  that  point,  49%  of  total  cost  will  be  incurred
after  becoming  pensioned.
Sources  of  Cost  in  the  New  Chilean  Pension  System
a)  Marketing  versus  other  expenditures
Standard  discussions  point  towards  the  presence  of  marketing  costs,
which  are  unique  to  the  Chilean  system  because  registered  persons  can
choose  fund  management  company.  These  expenditures  do  not  exist  in
pension  systems  managed  by  a  state  monopoly,  where  purchase  of  services
from  the  monopoly  is  mandatory 1 2. They  are  reduced  significantly  in
occupational  pension  systems,  where  the  employer  chooses  provider  of
pension  services.
The  evidence  for  AFPs  is  summarized- in  Table  7  in  the  form  of  two  cost
ratios:
12  The  mandatory  feature  implies  that  marketing  expenditures  can  at  most  improve  allocation  of
affiliates  between  firms,  but.  will  draw  very  few  clients  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Therefore,  these
marketing  are  efficient  as  long  as  they  allow  a  better  matching.  which  can  happen  only  if  there
is  variation  in  quality  or  scope  of  services.  This  condition  fails-  when  a  statute  or  regulation
spell  out  exactly  the  quality  or  every  service  and  leave  no  or  little  scope  for  individual  choice.
In  that  casem provision  can  be  auctioned  by  the  authorities.  but  irreversible  investments  will
limit competitiou  by  bids,  leading  to  a  bilateral monopoly. A  monopoly state-owned provider
also  has  bargaining'power..-21-
Table  S
Marketing  Costs  of  Private  Fund  Managers  in  Chile,  by  AFPs  (1990-91)
P. Fund Manager  Marketing CaStS  Marketing Costs
(AFP)  Other  Costs  except  Total AFP Income"
Reinsurance  *
1990  1991  1990  1991
Concordia  34.8%  33.2%  18.2%  19.3%
Cuprum  84.3%  82.3%  20.7%  19.3%
El  Libertador  27.7%  35.7%  12.1%  17.7%
Futuro  21.3%  28.2%  7.7%  12.1%
Habitat  19.4%  26.7%  6.8%  10.8%
InvierLa  21.9%  26.3%  13.7%  14.5%
Magister  22.5%  29.3%  13.6%  17.8%
Planvital  41.7%  58.9%  20.8%  25.8%
Protecci6n  75.5%  62.2%  23.8%  24.2%
Provida  32.1%  35.7%  12.3%  5S.0%
Santa  Maria  32.6%  35.2%  13.5%  15.3%
Summa  23.0%  ?6.5%  9.1%  11.1%
Uni6n  30.3%  29.3%  15.4%  15.7%
TOTALSYSTEM  30.8%  34.6%  12.5%  14.9%
*  All  other  operating  costs.  excluding  the  cost  of  invalidity  and  survivorship  reinsurance
coverage.
t  This  is  the  same - total  commission  income,  including  that  used  to  finance  pay  back  invalidity
and  survivorship  compensation.
Source:  AFP income  and  loss  statements.
An  average  of  14.9%  of  total  AFP  income  is  a  rather  low  figure  when
compared  to  the  emphasis  put  on  this  cost  element  by  most  analysts  of  the
Chilean  system.  However,  this  figure  has  increased  substantially  in  1992  and
1993,  as  the  entry  of  6  more  AFPs  into  the  market  - an  increase  from  13 to
19  providers  - has  brought  a  sort  of  "marketing  war"  with  heavy
expenditure.
Total  AFP  marketing  costs  in  1991  were  13.729  billion  pesos,  or  36.66
million  dollars.  Dividing  by  3.282  million  effective  covered  workers,  we
obtain  11.17  US  dollars  per  year.
Life-time  marketing  costs  also  include  those  incurred  by  the  life
insurance  industry  and  the  insurance  brokers  that  -sell-  annuities  to
pensioners.  Reports  about  the  fee  earned  by  insurance  brokers  range  from
3.5  to  4.5%  of  the  premium 13. Taking  an  average,  this  -would  mean  that
13  On  the  495% figure.  see  public  statement  by  Mr.  GermAi  Molina,  President  of  AFP  Habitam  in
newspaper  El  Mercurio,  page  B3.  July  20,  1993,  Santiago.  Chile.  Reported  accounting  figures- 22  -
approximately  4.0D10.23 =  -39% of  the  charge  by  insurance  companies  is
spent  on  marketing.  In  dollar  terms,  this  would  be  0.39x30.8  =  ! 2.04  US
dollars  per  year  per  effective  covered  worker.
Therefore,  lifetime  marketing  costs  would  add  up  to  23.23  US  dollars
per year, or 26% of total life time costs.
If  all  marketing  costs  disappeared  and  were  passed  on  to  workers,  the
lifetime  administrative  charge  in  the  Chilean  system  would  still  be  65.9  US
dollars  per  year  per  effective  covered  worker.  This  is  still  a  substantial
figure,  so  other  explanations  for  the  relatively  high  administrative  charge
should be  sought for the Chilean case.
On  the  other  hand,  eliminating  marketing  expenditure  by  law  would  be
a  big  mistake  in  the  Chilean  context.  In  the  first  place,  that  would  reduce
competition  and  create  large  barriers  to  entry,  as  salespeople  and
advertising  are  the  main  vehicle for  the  information  flows  towards  workers.
Secondly,  salespeople  provide  directly  the  following  services  to
workers,  that  would be  lost:
a)  AFP  Salespeople:  explaining  the  meaning  of  the  individual  account;
explaining  the  concept  of  rate  of  return  differences;  offering  pension
projections  to  help  workers  in  personal  pension  planning;  explaining  options
such  as  additional  voluntary  contributions  and  early  retirement;  helping
personnel  managers  use  the  pension  system  to  match  theirs human  resource
management;  helping  workers  claim  invalidity  and  survivorship  insurance.
b)  Insurance  brokers  and  agents:  Explaining  the  features  of  the
alternative  annuity  contracts  available,  and  helping  the  worker  to  choose
one;  Explaining  the  differences  between  insurance  companies,  ideally
including  information  about  their  risk  rating;  identification  and
documentation of  the  true  number  of  dependents  that  the  law  requires  to  be-
covered  with  survivorship  insurance  and  longevity  insurance.  In  many  cases
this  implies  acknowledgement  of  ex-spouses  and  unrecognized  children.
Thirdly,  the  existence  of  multiple  potential  providers  (AFPs  and  life
insurance  companies),  which  requires  marketing  expenditures,  is  what
provides  the  high  quality  of  pension  services  in  Chile.  Specifically,
competitive  private  provision  reduces  the  likelihood  of  default  because  of
the  existence  of  private  contracts  that  workers  can  claim  in  the  courts,  and
seem to  be  distorted  because manager; in  life  insurance companies shift costs  to  other  items  to
reduce  regulatory  pressure.-23 -
because  of  the  political  implications  of  the  presence  of  private  providers
with a  direct  mandate to  invest  the funds in  the  best  possible  way.
c)  Sources  of  non-marketing costs
In  this  section  we  investigate  sources  of  cost  by  disaggregating
between  different  AFPs.  In  the  following  table,  effective  covered  workers
are  defined  as  registered  persons  that  had  contributed  at  least  once  in  the
last  12  months.  This  latter  number  was  corrected  by  an  estimate  of  the
number  of  contributors  whose  processing  had  taken  more  than  a  month,
estimated  to  be  6.2%  from  the  industry  figure  for  March  1992.14  Total net
charges  by  each  AFP are defined  as  commission income  minus payments for
invalidity  and  survivorship  insurance,  both  of  which  are  taken  from  audited
income  and  loss  statements  for  1991.  The  non-marketing  charge  subtracts
reported  marke:ing  costs  from  the  previous  figure.
Table  6
Charnt  ner  covered  workers  by  AFP.  1991
(1992  US  dollars  per  effecfive  covered  worker)
Name of  AFP  Number  of  Average  Non-marketing  Average
Effective  Net  Charge  average  Wage  of  Contributors
covered  workers  (US  dollars  Charge  (US  doll.  per
(March  1992)  /year)  (US  dol./year)  month,  Mar.  92)
Concordia  108,103  35.3  26.8  169.8
Provida  964,130  37 4  28.6  250.1
Santa  Maria  676.195  45.4  35.5  256.9
- -- average  for  the  system -
Habitat  599,840  56.0  47.9  322.0
Summa  264,654  57.0  46.8  370.7
Planvital  69.613  57.8  40.1  250.7
El  Libertador  65,646  63.3  45.3  351.7
Magister  57,976  63.9  48.8  265.7
Invierta  92.490  67.5  55.4  236.8
Uni6n  245,555  70.3  55.7  291.0
Cuprum  93,515  95.1  61.7  673.3
Proteccidn  36,012  131.2  85.4  601.1
Futuro  7,103  148.5  119.6  656.6
TOTAL  3,280,832  51.6  40.4  299.2
Source:  Last  column,  Boletin  N 0 1109 April  1992, page  64.
14 More precisely,  the  estimate was  produced with  the  formula: Eff.  Cov. Workers  =  A  - B(1-
0.062x(A/C)). where A =  total  registered persons: B=  registered persons that did  not  contribute
in the  last 12 months; C  =  registered persons that did not contribute in the  current month.-24-
This  table  shows  that- heterogeneity  is  substantial.  Net  total  average
charge for 53  % of  Chilean covered workers is  22% lower  than  the average
charge for the system as a  whole. The case of  AFP Provida is  noteworthy, as
its  average net  charge  is  28% below the  average for  the system and  is  the
largest in Chile.
The figures for  non-marketing charges show  that  the  Chilean AFPs that
charge  less  have  an  average  administrative  charge  close  to  the  Malaysian
EPF  plus  SOCSO,  which  provides  roughly  equivalent  services  in  the  non-
marketing areas,  as  described  below. These  figures  also  suggest  that  non-
marketing  average  charges  vary  less  across  AFPs  than  marketing  average
costs.
Average  net  charges  vary  both  because  of  differences  in  cost  and
because  of  different  profit  margins.  Differences  in  cost  could  be  due  to
economies of scale, but  the charges of  three large AFPs: Habitat, Summa and
Uni6n,  suggests  that  this  may  be  less  than  half  the  total  story.  That
differences  in  profit  margins  are  large  is  most  obvious  regarding  Cuprum,
Protecci6n  and  Futuro,  who  serve  groups  of  workers  with  high  average
covered wages.  If  the  information in  table  6  is  analyzed together  with that
in  table  4,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  structure  of  commissions is  misaligned
with respect  to  the  structure of  costs,  as  most  charges  are  proportional  to
wages while few  costs  are.  As discussed elsewhere,  this  is  due  to  political
pressure on  AFPs to  reduce their flat charges, which are seen as regressive.
Another  possible  explanation  for  non-marketing  costs  is  that  Chilean
AFPs do  not exploit economies of joint  collection to  the fullest. One example
is  that  they lack  a  common collecting agent to  confront each  employer. We
.discuss  in  the  conclusions  the  fact  that  AFPs  are  free  to  rearrange  their
collection  system.  AFPs  use  the  banking  clearinghouse  to  channel  many
payments. Each  employer  must  fill  a  different  form  for  each  AFP, but  the
administrative costs  for  employers are  not  available.
An  important  factor  in  overall  cost  is  the  excessive  quality  of  output
which  the  law  and  regulations  imposes  on  AFPs.  Two  examples  are  the
monthly  actualization  of  all  records,  which  in  other  countries  is  done
annually,  and  the  requirement  of  sending  by  mail  at  least  three  account
statements  to  each  member  per  year.  A  complementary  explanation  for
non-marketing charges  is  the  heavy regulatory  load  to  which  Chilean AFPs
are  subject.  Their  operations  are  regulated  in  amazing  detail,  including
investments,  marketing  procedures  and  methods,  the  contractual
relationship with  salespeople,  the  design  of  forms  and  the  relative  size  of
letters  -in their  advertisements.- 25
3.  Administrative  Charges  in  the  United  States
This  country  has  both  a  mandatory  state-run  earnings-related  pensions
system and occupational pensions that cover near  50%  of the  work force. We
discuss  the costs  of  each  of  these pension  systems separately.
3.1  Defined-Contribution  company  pension  plans  in  the  U.S.
In  the  U.S.  many  companies  offer  their  employees  a  defined
contribution  pension  plan.  This  consists  of  an  individual  account  into  which
the  employer  and  the  employee  invest  pre-tax  dollars.  Upon  leaving  the
firm,  the  worker  obtains  a  lump-sum  payment.  This  sum  can  maintain  its
tax-exempt  status  if  it  is  reinvested  within  60  days  with  the  next
employer's  pension  plan  or  in -an  investment  vehicle  that  cannot  be
withdrawn before age  62,  like  an  IRA or 401(k)  plan.
The portfolio of  services
Defined  contribution  plans  provide  a  portfolio  of  services.  The  first  is
record-keeping  through  individual  accounts  and  the  second  is  fund
management  services.  In  addition,  a  -substantial  amount  of  personal
information  is  provided.  In  1987,  91%  of  these  plans  allowed  workers  to
choose  the  asset  allocation  of  their  own  contributions  among  3  or  more
funds,  and  48  %  allow  employees  to  choose  the  asset  allocation  of  the
employer's  contribution  (Beller  and  Lawrence,  1992).  ,This  implies  a
substantial  amount  of  information  to  workers -and  significant  administrative
expenses  as  works  shuffle  funds.  Almost  all  plans  allow  the  worker  to  -
increase  his  contribution.  Although  there  are  no  separate  voluntary  savings
accounts  nor  severance  accounts,  it  is  common for  the  employer to  agree  to
special  severance  contributions.
Defined  contribution  plans  offer  limited  invalidity  and  no  survivors
insurance.  This  is  a  substantial  difference  with  the  Chilean  and  other
mandatory  pensio-n systems.  Many  workers  in  the  US  purchase  individual
life  insurance  to  cover  survivorship,  but  they  must  pay  separate  charges
there.
When  the  worker  retires  form  a  defined  contribution  plan,  he/she
receives  a  lump  sum  distribution.  The  result  is  that  there  is  no  insurance
against- longevity  risk  and  no  financial  guarantee  to  cover  investment  risk.
In  addition,  there  is  no  survivorship  insurance  for  pensioners,  nor  the
associated  longevity  insurance  and  investment  guarantee  for  the  widow  or
odier  survivors.  Of  course,  there  is- no  administrative  cost  associated  to  the- 26-
payment  of  monthly  pensions.  In  practice,  the  worker  must  buy  these
services  on  his  own,  paying  additional  charges.  Alternatively,  the  worker
absorbs  these risk  and avoids  the charges.
Charges versus Costs
These  plans  are  provided  by  the  employer  as  a  condition  for
employment.  The  employer  runs  the  individual  accounts,  purchases  group
invalidity  insurance  and  purchases  fund  management  services  from
specialized  companies that  manage substantial  blocks  of  funds.  Of  course,
there  is  no  collection expense. The incentive for  the employer to  select  fund
managers  that  perform reasonably  well  comes  from  two  sources.  First,  the
employer  wants  adequate  pension  coverage  for  its  workers.  Without  that
coverage,  it  would  be  difficult  to  fire  older  workers  peacefully,  so  much
higher  severance  payments  are  being  avoided  by  having  a  successful
pension  plan.  Second,  the  employer  wants  real  benefits  to  use  them  as
.incentives  to  reduce  rotation  of  younger  workers  and  assure  exit  of  old
workers,  allowing it  to  influence its  total  personnel costs  and  human  capital
building.
Large  U.S.  employers are  vertically integrated  with  the  function  that  in
Chile  is  performed by  APPs.  This  generates a  problem for  the  measurement
of  the  profit  component of  charges.  It  is  clear  that  the  administrative costs
that  employers allocate to  pensions cannot be  purchased at  that  price  in  the
open  market, because they  do  not  include an  allowance for  a  normal return
on  investment. Of  course  there  is  no  information to  measure' this  component
of  total  charges  paid  by  the  employee, so  a  comparison with  other  systems
tends  to  be  biased downwards.
This  does  not  imply that  vertical  integration is  cheaper for  workers,  but
that  this  margin  is  being  charged  at  another  stage  of  the  employment
relationship,  probably  through  lower  wages  and  other  compensation.
In  the  area  of  marketing,  as  the  employer  chooses  the  fund  manager,
marketing  costs  appear  to  be  low.  However,  vertical  integration  shifts
marketing  costs  to  the  employment  selection  stage.  In  the  United  States
choosing  an  employer  is  much  harder than  in  Chile,  because the  generosity
of  the  pension  plan  must  be  assessed  and  compared  across  employment
offers.  The  fact  that  workers  have  difficulties  measuring  pension  plan
generosity  can  be  gleaned  from  the  prevalence  of  nominal  annuities  in
company  pension  plans,  even  though  other  investments  offer  much  better
protection  from  inflation.-27-
Coverage
In  1987, defined  contribution  plans  in  the  United  States  covered 34.959
million workers in  total.  Of these,  only  13.437 million had it  as  the  primary
plan. Another  16.110 million had  a  basic  defined  benefit  plan  plus  a  defined
contribution  plan  as  supplement.  Finally,  5.413  million  workers  had  two
other  plans  apart  form  their  defined  contribution  plan.  (Beller  and
Lawrence,  Table  4.7).  Of  all  these  workers,  28.838  belonged  to  plans  that
had  at  least  100  members  in  1987. To  project  total  member  numbers  into
1988,  one  should  consider  that  the  time  series  of  total  participants  in
defined contribution plans  tends  to  taper  off,  growing only  1% in  1987  over
1986 (Table 4.1). We will use this figure to  project  1988.
It  should  also  be  realized  that  many  of  these  workers  receive  a  lump
sum  when  they  exit  the  firm,  not  at  age  65.  This  has  implications  for
coverage,  because  some  of  these  workers  are  not  entitled  to  the  benefits
offered  by  the  employer,  only  to  the  accumulated  sums  originating  in  his
own  contributions.  Therefore,  the degree  of  actual  coverage  is  heterogeneous-
and  many received  less  than  the  full  range  of  pension  services.  Because  of
the lack  of  information  to  deal  with  this  issue,  we  will  report  average  costs
based  on  the  total  number  of  workers  covered,  but  there  might  be  a
downward bias  in  reported  average  costs  because  of  this  factor.
Reported  Costs
Repoited  administrative  costs  of  all  defined  contribution  plans  were
1,410 million  dollars  in  198'.  True  costs  may  be  larger  because  individual
firms  are  allowed  to  absorb  part  of  the  cost  into  general  administrative
overhead.  Only  multiemployer  plans  have  a  clear  incentive  to  report  the
total cost,  which is  to  recover  it  from  their  member  firms. The tax  treatnent
for  both  accounting  practces  is  generally  neutrall5.
It  is  not  clear  either  how  the large  number- of  companies  that  run  both
defined  benefit  and  defined  contribution  plans  allocate  their  costs  between
these  two  categories.  Given  the  tendency  to  designate  as  the  primary  plan
the  defined-benefit  plan,  there  may  be  an  underestimation  of  costs  of
defined-contribution  plans.  For  the  plans  that  had  at  least  100  members,
total  reported  cost  was  796  million  in  1988  (Trends  in  Pensions  1992,
Tables  A-17  and  A-15).
15 I am grateful to  Mr. John Tumer, of the US Department of Labor, for this information.- 28-
Dividirhg total  costs  reported  for  1988 by  total  members projected  for
1988, and  adjusting this  figure  to  1992 dollars  by  a  4%  per  year estimated
inflation for four  years, we find the following results:
Table  7
Administrarive  Costs  in  Defined  Contribution  Plans
(Figure  for  1988,  in  1992 dollars  with  4%  inflation  for  four  years)
Cost  (dollars  per  year  per  covered  worker)
All Plans:  46.7
Plans  with  100 or  more  members:  32.0
The  order  of  magnitude of  these  figures  are  confirmed by  Turner  and
Beller  (1989).  They  found  an  average  cost  for  all  multiemployer  defined
contribution plans  of  $48.66  (1990  dollars)  and  substantial  economics  of
scale.
These  numbers could be  compared with  the  AFP figure  of  51.6  dollars
per  covered  worker,  which  does  not  include  the  retirement  phase  nor  the
invalidity  and  survivorship  insurance  charges.  This  is  not  an  exact
comparison basis,  however,  because AFPs currently  must  deal  with  workers
on  an  individual  basis  and  they  offer  more  services,  including payments to
t'7ose pensioners  who  chose  programmed withdrawal.
4.2  Defined  Benefit  company  pension  plans  in  the  U.S.
In the U.S. over  90% of  companies with more than  100 employees offer
their  employees a  defined  benefit  pension  plan.  This  consists  of  a  promise
issued by  the employer that it  wilU  pay a  pension for  life  to  any worker that
meets  a  minimum  residence  period.  In  a  typical  plan  the  amount  of  the
pension  is  defined  as  the  product -of  the  number  of  years  of  employment
times an  average of  wages received in  the  last  years  of  work times a  fixed
actuarial factor  between 0.01  and 0.02.
Pension  Services
The  portfolio  of  pension  services  offered  by  defined  benefit  plans  is
richer than  in  defmed contribution plans. First  of  all,  benefits are  a  monthly
pensions  and  not  a  lump  sum.  In  addition,  these  plans  offer  a  guaranteed
investment return  up  to  retirement,  provided the  worker  does  not  quit  the2  29-
firm  voluntarily.  Disability  insurance was offered  by  92% of  DB plans  in
1988, but  39% of  these paid  only a  deferred benefit. This  is  an  annuity that
begins  after  retirement  not  at  the  date  of  disability.  (Trends  in  pensions
1992, Table 9.16).  DB plans do  not  offer  survivor's insurance. Only 34  *  of
DB  plans  allowed  full-time  participants  to  withdraw  funds  for  hardship
reasons in  1989 (Table 9.25,  Trends in  Pensions 1992).
One important drawback of DB pensionz is  that they are nominal. Once a
worker  retires,  his  pension  is  not  adjusted  by  inflation  except  in  the
uncommon  situations  where  the  ex-employer  gives  pension  increases  for
which  there  is  no  contractual  obligation.  The  same  happens  to  deferred
pensions,  whose  amount  is  defined  as  of  the  date  of  exiting  the  firn  but
which  begin  to  be  paid  only  upon  reaching  an  age  like  65.  Therefore,  the
benefits of  these plans have lower  quality than  in  Chile's  AFPs because they
are  subject  to  inflation  risk.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  phase  where
investment  returns  are  guaranteed  by  the  firm  they  resemble  the  fixed  real
annuities  sold in  Chile  with the  difference that  the rate  of  return  is  the rate
of  growth of real  wages plus  the  rate  of  growth of  the  number  of  years  in
the  plan.
Many  of  the  comments regarding  the  differences  between  charges  and
costs  made in  the  previous  section  apply  to  defined  benefit  plans  also.  The
same  applies  to  the  apparent  saving  of  marketing  costs  due  to  vertical
integration  of  the  pension function  with the  employer.
One  new  area  refers  to  the  area  of  investment  guarantees  which  are
implicit  in  the pension offer.  This  is  because the  employer has  promised the
same pension  regardless of  actual  returns  in  the  capital  market. Some  argue
that  the  employer  is  a  natural  provider  of  this  financial  guarantee  to  the
worker,  so  vertical  integration  of  pension  provision  with  the  employer  is
cheaper  than direct  contracting  in  the  capieal market.
As  the employer may  be  charging for  this  service through lower  wages,
there  is  no evidence in  support of  this position. Moreover, the- quality of  this
financial  guarantee is  open  to  question,  given  the  fact  that  the  survival rate
of  most  firms over  a  30  or  40  year period is  consistently inferior  to  that of
life  insurance  companies.  This  is  the  result  of  explicit  solvency  regulation
imposed on  life  insurance companies, which is  very  costly  to  replicate  at  the
level  of  employers.  In  the  United  States,  Congress  created  the  Pension
Benefit  Guaranty  Corporation  to  cover  the  pension  promises  to  workers  in
failing  firms,  at  a  cost  to  the  federal  budget  that  is  being  estimated  only
now.  The PBGC is  trying  to  impose risk-adjusted insurance preemie,  but  this
raises  again  the  issues  associated  to  evaluations. of  firm  solvency  by  a
government agency. From the  point  of  view of  the  worker,  the  linkup of the- 30-
employment  to  the  offer  of  a  financial  guarantee  makes  selection  of
employer  extremely  complex,  with  an  uncertain  gain.
Costs
In  1987  total  administrative  cost  for  all  defined  benefit  pension  plans
in  the  U.S.,  was  4,514  million  dollars  and  covered  28.432  million workers.
Using  the  same  projection  and  inflation  adjustment  procedures,  the  average
administrative  cost  for  1988,  expressed  in  1992  dollars,  was  187.3  dollars
per  person.  For  those  defined  benefit  plans  with  at  least  100  members,  the
average  administrative  cost  was  172.8  in  1992  dollars.  The  reason  for  the
small  difference  is  that  very  few  employers  with  less  than  100  workers
offer  defined  benefit  plans  (Trends  in  Pensions  1992,  Tables  A-17  and  A-
15).
Multiemployer  plans  have  lower  administrative  costs.  Mitchell  and
Andrews  (1981)  using  1975  data  for  defined  benefit  multiemployer  plans
and  a  log  linear  cost  function  found  a  mean  cost  of  $49.03  per  participant
(1990  dollars)  and  large  economies  of  scale.  The  estimated  cost  falls  from
$335.6  for  100  participants  to  $32.63  for  20,000  participants.  They  find
very  substantial  economies  of  scale  in  assets  per  participant.  Turner  and
Beller  (1989)  found  an  average  cost  for  all  multiemployer  defined  benefit
plans  of  $101.11 (1990 dollars)  and  substantial economies of  scale.
The  large  cost  differential  with  defined  contribution  and  defined  benefit
plans is  one of  the explanations, among others, for  the  growth in  the share of
defined  contribution  plans  and  the  fall  in  the  absolute  number  of  defined
benefit  plans.
The  following  table  shows  the  differences  in  cost  structure  for  plans
with  more  than  100 participants:-31 -
Table  8
Comparison  of  Cosrs  of  Defined  Benefit  and  Defined  Contribution
Pension  Plans  with  more  than  100  participants  in  the  United  States,  in  1988.
(1988  dollars  per  covered  employee)
Source of  Cost  Defined  Defined  Cost Ratio
Factor  Benefit  Contribution  (DB/DC)
Investment  Advice
&  Management fees  38.60  6.94  5.5
Actuarial  fees  8.74  0.38  23.0
Accounting  fees  2.15  1.06  2.0
Salaries  and  Allowances  5.47  0.58  9.4
Contract  Administrator  fees  6.90  1.82  3.8
Legal  fees  3.05  0.58  5.3
Valuation/Appraisal  fees  0.41  0.27  1.5
Trustee  fees  and  expenses  10.37  3.81  2.7
Other  Administration  70.79  10.92  6.5
TOTALCOSTS  146.48  26.36  5.56
Non  Investment Mngmt. Costs  107.88  19.42  5.55
p  participants  projected  1988  26.530  29.118
(millions)
Source: Trends in  Pensions 1992, Table A-15.
In  1988  defined  benefit  plans  with  more  than  100  participants
managed  2.21  times  more  assets  per  covered  employee  than  defined
contribution plans,  which are  newer. This  is  not  the  source  of  the  difference
in cost,  as the  total cost  per million dollars of  assets in  defined benefit plans
is  2.51  times  that  in  defined  contribution  plans,  for  plans  with  more  than
100  participants.
If  costs  are  compared  as  a  percentage  of  assets,  DC  plans  are  more
expensive than DB  only when the factor is  smaller than 2.21.  These costs  do
not  consider the  net expected  value of  the  guarantees issued  by  the  Pension
Benefit  Guarantee Corporation in  favor  of  defined-benefit plans.
4.3  Life  Insurance  (annuities)  in  the  United  States
Defined-contribution plans  in  the United  States  usually pay  a  lump-sum
at  retirement.  To  obtain  lifetime  costs  comparable  with  the  Chilean  system,
we  must  consider  that  the  worker  needs  additional  pension  services  after
retirement.  One  important  case  occurs  when  the  worker chooses  to  buy  an- 32  -
annuity. This  section considers the administrative costs  of  the  life  insurance
industry, including commissiops to  agents  insurance brokers.
On  the  other  hand,  defined-benefit  plans  already  include  annuity
payments, so life  insurance costs should not  be  added to  those plans' costs to
avoid double counting.
Portfolio of  pension services
The  life  insurance  industry  offers  many  types  of  annuities.  They
provide  coverage  against  longevity  risk.  Of  cotcse,  payment  services
areembodied in  the  monthly  payments.
Most annuities  are  nominal,  i.e.  denominated in  dollars,  but  variable  -
rate  annuities and  CPI-indexed annuities also  exist.  In  the  case  of  nominal
annuities,  the  pension  product  is  of  low  quality  because  the  worker  is
exposed to  inflation risk,  which is  substantial  over  the  term  of  the  annuity
and  hits  hardest  the, oldest  retirees.  In  the  case  of  variable  annuities,  the
worker  is  exposed  to  investment  risk,  as  they  are  usually  quite  heavily
invested  in  equities.  CPI-indexed  annuities  are  almost  non-existent  in  the
United  States,  because there  is  very  little  corporate  or  public  debt  indexed
to the CPI.
Coverage
In  1991, the  number of  annuity contracts  in  force  in  the  United States
was  17.343 million  individual  contracts  and  1.059  million  group  contracts,
many  of  them  bought  by  firms  that  provided  defined  benefit  pensions for
their  employees. The  flow  of  annuity contracts  issued  during  the year  1991
was  close  to  13%  of  the  number  outstanding  for  both  types  of  contract.
Annuity  payments  represented  40%  of  all  benefit  payments  by  life
insurance  companies  in  1991,  or  $36.6  billion.  The  stock  of  annuities  is
increasing,  as  reflected  in  the  premium income  of  $123.6  billion  from  all
annuities  in  force  in  1991.  Annuity  premiums  have  increased  from  1% of
disposable personal income in  the  1970s to  an  average of 3.05  % in  1989-91
(Life Insurance Fact Book, 1992).
Variable  annuities  --  which  include  equity-linked  and  CPI-indexed
annuities  --  covered  2.838  million  persons  in  individual  plans  and  3.059
million in  group plans in  1991.
Charges
The available  costs  figures are for  the annuity  business and for  all  life
insurance- lumped  together.-33-
Bringing together all  lines  of  business, and  as- a  proportion of  premium
income  and  investment  earnings1 6,  commissions to  agents were  4.5%,  home
and  field  office  expenses  were  7.0%  and  dividends  to  shareholders  in  joint
stock  companies were  2.4%.  The  total  charge  for  the  client  would  then  be
13.9%  plus  retained  earnings  in  1991,  assuming  that  the  risk-adjusted
investment return paid  by  the  companies is  in  line  with  returns  obtained by
investing  directly  in  the  market.
Regarding  the  composition  of  costs  in  all  lines  of  business,  Wright
(1992)  reports  that,  as  a  proportion  of  1989-  operating  expenses,
commissions  to  brokers  and  agents  were  41.5%,  salaries,  wages  and  other
compensation  were  26.9%,  advertising  expenditure  was  1.4%,  real  estate
costs  were 4.4%  and investment operations 11.0%.
More  specific information  was  obtained  on  the  annuity  business,  which
is  of  direct  interest  to'  pensions.  However,  the  methodology  is  not
comparable  to  that  used  for  Chilean  life  insurance companies.  In  that  case
we  started  with  the  spread  between  annuity  and  bond  yields.  Here  we  use
accounting data  on  profits.  This  data  is  more significant  that  in  Chile  since
the annuity business in  the  United States has  been established for  long:
Table  9
Annuity Premiums and  Charges in  the  United States
(billions  of  current  dollars  and  %)
Individuals  Groups
1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991
Premiums  49.41  53.67  51-.67  65.59  75.40  71.92
(1)  Commissions  2.22  2.70  2.89  0.41  0.56  0.66
(2)  General  Expenses  1.55  1.71  1.88  1.65  1.82  1.93
Total Expenses(1)+(2)  3.77  4.41  4.77  2.06  2.38  2.59
(3)  Accounting  profit
before taxes  4.21  3.82  5.94  1.84  3-.78  2.48
Total Charges  on
Annuitants  (1l.+(2)+(3)  7.98  8.23  10.71  3.90  6.16.  5.07
Expenscs/Premiums  7.6%  8.2%  9.2%  3.1%  3.2%  3.6%
T.  Charges/Premiums  16.2%  15.3%  20.7%  6.0%  8.2%  7.1%
Average  1989-91  17.4%  7.1%
Source:  American Council of  Life  Insurance, in  private  communication with  Suzanne
Stennock.
16 pm  of prenamings  in 1991. 16  Premimncome  was 67.9%  of  thie  su  of premiurm  income anxd  invesunltmeant  nsi  91-34-
The  difference  in  expenses  between  individual  and  group  annuities  is
remarkable.  However,  the  difference  in  the  level  of  profits  is  even  more
pronounced,  suggesting  that  a  different  product  may  be  involved.  Another
possibility  is  that  competition  is  much  tougher  in  the  group  annuity
segment,  maybe  because buyers  are  more  sophisticated.
The  low level  of  expenses  in  group  annuities, which  averages 3.3%  of
premiums is  confirmed by  information on  the  period  1942-62:
Table  10
Group Annuity  Expenses in  1942-1962
(%  of  premiums)
Year  Commissions  Other  Expenses  Total  Expenses
(excluding  profits  and  taxes)
1942  0.53%  1.36%  1.89%
1943  0.50%  1.33%  1.83%
1944  0.49%  1.13%  1.62%
1945  0.48%  1.34%  1.82%
1946  0.42%  1."%  1.86%
1947  0.43%  1.46%  1.89%
1948  0.38%  1.43%  1.81%
1949  0.40%  1.45%  1.85%
1950  0.32%  1.24%  1.56%
1951  0.33%  1.33%  1.66%
1952  0.32%  1.27%  1.59%
1953  0.31%  1.51%  1.82%
1954  0.29%  1.53%  1.82%
1955  0.28%  1.62%  1.90%
1956  0.29%  1.79%  2.08%
1957  0.29%  1.94%  2.23%
1958  0.28%  2.13%  2.41%
1959  0.25%  2.10%  2.35%
1960  0.30%  2.67%  2.97%
1961  0.30%  2.90%  3.20%
1962  0.30%  2.92%  3.22%
Source: McGill. D., Fundamentalk of  Private  Pensions. First  (1955) and Second editions,
tables  14  and  7  respectively. These  tables  report  the  wheighted average cost  for  seven
leading  companies, so  smaller companies  are  excluded.
Care  must  be  exercised  in  interpreting  these  figures,  because  they  do
not  include  profits.  In  addition,  a  low  expense  to  premium  ratio  may  be  due
to  large  premiums,  not  to  low  costs.  A  cartel  in  the  annuity  industry  may
charge  large  premiums  in  comparison  to  the  expected  benefits,  implying  a
low  rate  of  return.  That  would  show  up  as  a  large  profit  and  a  small-35  -
expense, as  a  proportion of  premiums. The  tota! cost  to  the  annuitant is  the
sum of  profit and expense.
To  check  our  estimate  of  the  charges  on  annuitants  we  can  use
information  on  average  spreads  provided  by  Friedman  and  Warshawsky
(1990).  They  report  that  in  the  period  1968-1983, on  average  the  yield  on
individual  annuities  was  2.43%  below  the  yield  on  comparable  duration
government  bonds.  Both  annuities  and  bonds  pay  in  dollars  (nominal).
Considering an  average level  for  long-term yields of  10%, and  a  duration  of
8  years  (at  age  65,  life  expectancy was  17.2  years  in  1990 for  the  whole
population,  including  those  that  do  not  purchase  annuities),  this  spread
implies  a  discount  of  16.37 %  over  the  premium'7. This is  not far  from our
accounting number  for  individual annuities,  which was  17.4%.
Total  lifetime  costs  of private pensions
In  this  section  we  produce  some  hypothetical  figures  to  add  together
the charges  for  pension services that  a  U.S.  worker must  pay  over  the life
cycle.  We  attempt  to  add  the  costs  of  defined  contribution  plans  with  the
charges  by  life  insurance  companies,  in  order  to  compare  them  with  the
costs  of  defined  benefit plans.
A  dollar  figure  for  average annuity  costs  should  be  based  on  the  active
part  of  life,  so  that  it  could  be  directly  added  to  other  administrative costs
such  as  those  incurred  in  defined  contribution  plans.  Comparability  also
depends  of  the  amount of  savings devoted to  purchase the  annuity.
We will consider a case of  a defined contribution plan that saves  10% of
the average covered wage  to  be  fully  invested  in  an  annuity  at  retirementL 8.
The  10% savings rate  is  less  than  standard, so  the  resulting figure  is  biased
downward.  In  this  case  we  apply  the  contribution  rate  to  the  average
accounting  data  on  charges  for  1989-91,  to  find  the  amount  that  must  be
put  aside  while active  to  pay  the  cost  of  an  annuity. The  resulting figure  is
1.74% of  the  covered wage for  individually purchased annuities.  For  a  group
annuity, that figure falls  to 0.71% of the covered wage. The actual size of  the
pension will depend of  the investment returns,  so we do  not  meet any  target
17  [(1.10  - 0.0243)/1.1018  = 0.8363 =  I  - 0.1637
18 This  is  not  impossible. In  1984 houscholds whose head was aged 55-64 held $  47,900 in  all
types  of  life  insurance  both  individual and  employer-based (ACLI 1992 Factbook. page  38).
When considering an inflation of 4% per  year in  1984-1992  and a  real rate of return of 3% real
available to  the  worker for  35  years. we  find  that this  sum could have been accumulated by
putting aside  S3,051 a  year. This  is .16.5% of  the average 1992 annual salary but only 8.2% of
the  nnuial salary  of  persons  with  double  average  income,  which  are  typical  purchasers  of
insurance.*36-
pension  level.  This  is  in  agreement  with  the  philosophy  of  defined
contribution  plans.
As  the.  average  covered  wage  can  be  estimated  at  US$18,441  in  the
United States  in  1992 19, the annual  cost  while active  of  the  annuity  portion
of  this  private  pension  is  $320.9  for  individual  contracts  and  $130.9  for  a
group contract. This  allows us  to  obtain the  following results:
Table  11
Lifetime  charges in  the  US  Private Pension  system
(US  dollars  per  covered  worker  per  year)
Costs/Charges  DC Plans  DB Plans
Active  Life  46.7  included
Passive  Life
a) Individual  320.9  included
b) Group  130.9
Total
a) Individual  367.6
b) Gwup  177.6  187.3
This  estimate  suggests  that  defined  contribution  and  defined  benefit
plans  have  versr similar  costs  for  the  covered  worker  on  a  lifetime  basis,
provided  that  the  annuity  is  purchased in  groups.  The  lifetime  cost  is  close
to double that in  Chile.
4.4  The  Social  Security  Administration  in  the  U.S.
The  mandatory  pension  system  in  the  US  pays  old-age,  disability  and
survivors  pensions  using  a  defined  benefit  formula.  This  system  also
generates  income  redistribution  through  two  mechanisms.  The  first  is  that
the  actuarial  factors  used  to  calculate  benefits  are  not  individually  fair,  so
they  redistribute,  for  example, in  favor  of  those  that  have  the  expectation  to
live  more  than  average.  The  second mechanism for  redistribution  is  that  the
benefit  formula has  a  floor  and  caps,  so  it  pays  a  higher  rate  of  return  to
those  that  have  contributed  less  in  the  past.
Contributions are  12.4% of  eamings,  with  a  maximum taxable earning  of
55,500  dollars  per  year  in  1-992. In  1988,  94%  cf  contributors  had  earnings
below  this  threshold,  and  covered  earnings  were  89%  of  all  wages  and
salaries.  Approximately  80%  of  workers  between  21  and  64  are  covered  in
19 Source: EBRI (1992) page  161 dividing the  tomal  taxable earnings of covered workers for  1990.
and then inflating bv 4% to consider nominal wage growth.37 -
the  event  of  long-term severe  disability.  The  self-employed  are  required  to
pay  contributions when filing  their  income tax.
Coverage
During  1990 the  Social  Security  Administration (SSA)  received  at  least
one  monthly contribution from  133.6 million  people. This  is  larger  than  the
employed labor  force of  126.4 million at  any one  point in  time  in  the  same
year  because  of  people  that  move  in  and  out  of  covered  employment.  In
1990  the  SSA  paid  old  age  pensions  to  28.361  million  people,  survivor
pensions  to  7.197  million  people  and  disability  pensions  (no  medical
treatment) to 2.995 million invalids and their families.  (EBRI, pages  164 and
425).
In  1990, this  pension  system  paid  old-age  pensions  that  replaced  43%
of  pre-retirement  income  of  an  average  earner.  The  average  monthly
pension for  workers who retired  at  65  in  1990 was  743 dollars. The  average
disability  pension,  excluding  dependents,  was  587  dollars  per  month  in
1990.  Pensions  are  indexed  to  the  CPI.  As  the  benefit  formula  in  this
pension  system is  redistributive, the  SSA is  producing jointly  the  service  of
distributing subsidies. This aspect is  similar to  what Chilean AFPs do,  but the
Malaysian EPF does not do this.
The  Social  Security  Administration  does  not  provide  investment
services  because the  financing  method is  PAYG, i.e.  100%  of  the  pension
entitlement  portfolio  is  invested  in  government  comdhitments  to  pay
pensions  in  the future.  The  trust  funds accumulating since  1983 are  entirely
invested  in  specially  issued  non-transferable  federal  debt.  This  aspect
diminishes  substantially  the  quality  of  pensions  offered,  because  this
portfolio  is  clearly  inefficient  through -xcessive  exposure  to  political  risk.
Individual  reports  of  contributions  and  projected  pensions  are  available
upon  request  since  the  late  1980's. There  are  information  services  regarding
benefit eligibility. The total  number of local  offices attending queries is  close
to  1,300. The  SSA does  not  offer  voluroiary savings  accounts nor  severance
accounts.
Since  1975 the  ratio  of  covered workers to  beneficiaries of  old-age  and
survivors pensions has  stabilized in  3.8.  This  ratio  is  expected to  fall  to  the
1.9-2.0 range  for  2030  and  stabilize  thereafter,  as  the- entry  of  women  into
the  workforce levels  off  and  the  age structure stabilizes.- 38  -
Costs
As  this  is  the  first  state-run  pension  system  we  discuss  in  detail,  it  is
useful to  repeat  some concepts expressed at  the  outset. First,  the issue  of the
quality of  pension promises must be  kept  in  mind. For  example, in  the  U.S.
there  has  been  widespread  worries  about  the  ability  of  the  federal
government  to  tax  future  generations  of  worker  at  the  rates  needed  to
sustain the  currently  promised level  of  benefits.  In fact,  the  U.S.  has  private
pens:ons  partly  because  larger  public  pensions  have  not  been  deemed
desirable.
In  1991, the  SSA paid  salaries  for  3,055  million  dollars,  including  non
wage  benefits 20. As  total employees  were  64,013  in  1991, an  approximation
for  the  average  annual  gross  salary  (before  taxes  and  social  security
contributions)  is  47,725.  This  is  2.6  times  the  average  insured  wage  of  the
overed U.S.  population, which was  18,441 dollars per  year in  1991 (EBRI, p.
161). .The average  take-home salary at  the  SSA  was 28,176  dollars  per  year
in  1989.
In  state-managed  pension  systems  true  costs  can  differ  from  reported
costs because of  sizable implicit subsidies and  taxes. For  example, the  capital
cost of office space and of equipment is  not reported in  full  in  the SSA costs
given  below2l.  The  missing costs  inciude interest and  risk premium.
The  most  notable  apparent  cost-saver  in  the  SSA  case  is  that
contribution  collection  is  performed  by  the  Intemal  Revenue  Service  (tax
authority).  The. IRS  allocates  part  of  its  cost  to  the  SSA  and  to  Medicare
through a  procedure  unknown to  us.  The  resulting allocation  is  such  that  of
total reported  administrative cost  at the  SSA, 6.86% is  accounted for  by  tne
"revenue function", most of  which is  the IRS allocation in  the case of  old-age
and  survivors.  The  rest  of  Teported cost  is  due  to  the  "benefit  function"  in
both  old-age-survivorship  and  invalidity 22.
In  the  case  of  old-age  and  survivorship  we  will  report  the  average
administrative  cost  in  the  US  in  per-pensioner  basis,  as  follows  from  the
origin  of  costs  in  the SSA. Reporting this  cost  on  a  per  contributor  basis  is
misleading in  the  case  of  the  old  age  and  survivors'  insurance because very
20  Budget document  from the  SSA.
21  Depreciation  is  included  in  the  costs  reported.  See  A-  Sunden  and  0.  Mitchell  (1993).
22  Table  2  in  A.  Sunden  and  0.  Mitchell  (1993).- 39 -
few  costs  seem  to  be  associated  to  that  function 23. In  the  case  of  invalidity
administrative  costs  should  be  presented  on  a  per-worker  basis.
For  the  federal  pension  system in  the  U.S.,  total  reported  administrative
costs  were  the  following:
Table  12
Annual  Administrative costs  in  US  Social  Security
(mUilions of  current  dollars)
Invalidity  Number  of  Invalidity  Old-Age  Number  of  Average
Year  Administrative  Covered  cost  per  &  Surviv.  Pensions  Cost  per
Cost  Workers(m.)  worker*  Adm. Costs  (million)  pensioner*
1988  737  129.6  6.7  1,776  34.54  60.2
1989  754  132.1  6.4  1.673  35.01  53.8
1990  707  133.6  5.7  1,563  35.56  47.5
:  1992 dollars per year.  assuming that inflation was 4%  per  year.
Sources:  Social  Security  Bulletin.  Annual  Statistical  Bulletin  1990,  page  129;  EBRI
Databook on  Employee Benefits.  1992. pages  161 and  164. This  table  does  not  consider
the  Supplemental  Security  Income  program  which  provided  means-tested  pensions,
nor  the  Black  Lung  program. both  administered by  the  SSA.
The  cost  figure  for  invalidity  is  a  bit  higher  than  Chilean  charges,
specially  when  considering  that  it  does  not  include  coverage  for
survivorship.  However,  direct  comparisons  are  of  limited  use  given  the
differences  in  accident  rates  and  actual  coverage.
The cost  figure  for  pensioners  must  be  transformed into  a  cost  per  year
in  active  life  to  make  an  appropriate  comparison  with  the  other  figures
presented  in  this  paper.  The  adjustment  reduces  the  figure  because  of  two
reasons:  first  the  number  of  active  years  (close  to  40)  is  higher  than  the
average number  of years  as pensioner (close to  17 in  1989). Second. the real
rate  of  return  on  contributions,  adjusted  by  risk,  is  probably positive  in  the
United  States.  The  appropriate  rate  of  return  of  a  pay-as-you-go  financed
pension  system  is  the  sum  of  the  rate  of  growth  of  real  wages  and  of  the
23 Unfortunately  this practice was followed  in the first draft of this paper. On the other hand, it is
possible that  the  "benefit function' includes the  costs of  maintaining  earnings records. This
function should be of  low cost  because they are not  used until pensioning  unless the  person
requests a  projection of  his pension. As this right has been available only since 1989 these
requests  are infrequent Still. it would be desirable  to brak  down SSA costs further, to  separate
the funcion of  maintenance  of records.-40-
rate  of  growth  of  the  covered  workforce, minus a  risk  premium  to  consider
the  chance  that  real  benefits  are  adjustment  downwards  by  the  political
system.  As  an  illustration  we  offer  calculations  for  cases  where  the  risk-
adjusted rate  of return  is  0%  and  1% per  year.  The adjustment of  the  figure
for  1990 would then be  as follows:
47.5  1 - (I+J±Q  1U-1 7 =  15.1  U.S.  $/year  if r= 1%
(1+0.01)40 -1
and  47.5 (17/40) - 20.2 U.S. $/year  if r  0%.
In  addition,  the  adjustment  must  take  into  account  that  there  may  be
more  than  one  survivor  per  covered  worker  that  dies.  Observation  of  the
composition  of  survivors  suggests  that  there  are  few  child  survivors.  For
example, in  1990 1.776 million  pensions were  paid  to  children  out  of  a  total
of  35.559  million  pensions  (5%).  This  suggests  that  we  should  inflate  the
average  cost  figure  by  (110.95)- to  estimate  the  average  cost  per  covered
worker.  On the other  hand, as 6.86% of reported costs  in the SSA are  indeed
collection  costs,  we  should  also  adjust  the  previous  figure  multiplying  by
0.9314. As  the  net effect  is  negligible the adjustment  is  not  presented.
The resulting cost of  15-20  U.S. dollars per  year  may be  compared with
the  130.9 U.S.  dollars  per  year  we found  for  group  annuities  and  320.9  for
individual  annuities  we  found  in  the  U.S.  life  insurance  industry.  The
difference  between  this  figure  is  staggering,  and  should  be  investigated
further.  Although a  part  of  the  difference may  be  explained  by  the  omission
of  the cost  of  capital  in  SSA  accounting, it  seems clear  that  other costs  and
charges  must  explain  the  bulk  of  the  difference  within  the  U.S.  Another
comparison  is  with  the  30.4  U.S.  dollars  per  year  we  found  for  Chilean
annuities,  but  that  is  clearly  biased  by  the  substantially  lower  level  of
premiums in  Chile.
The  most  important issue  in  SSA costs  is  that  reported  collection  costs
are  negligible. If  collection costs  are 6.86% of  reported costs  for  old age  and
survivorship  (Sunden  and  Mitchell,  1993),  they  would  amount  to  107.2
million US  dollars in  1990, which is  a  negligible 82  cents per  covered worker
per  year  in  1990.
These  costs  appear  to  be  negligible because of  two  reasons.  The  first  is
that  cost  allocation  of  joint  production  is  notoriously  difficult  when none  of-41 -
the  joint  products  is  marginal24. Contributions  are  non-marginal  when  they
have  to  be  collected  anyway  even  if  no  personal  income  tax  exist.  For
example,  in  the  U.S.  it  is  clear  that  if  the  income  tax  were  replaced  with
another  set  of  taxes,  social  security  contributions  would  still  have  to  be
collected  and  the  joint  cost  would  have  to  be  supported  by  the  SSA  alone.
When  reported  cost  allocations  are.  based  on  the  marginal  individual
tasks,  such  as  the  cost  of  typing  an  extra  line  for  social  security
contribudions,  then  the  joint  cost  is  excluded  by  definition.  Such  measures
report  the  specific  costs,  not  the  joint  costs.  The  negligible  cost  figure
reported  for  the  SSA  may  be  related  to  this  type  of  mistake.  This  could  be
the  main  reason  for  the  low  reported  costs  in  the  SSA.
The  second  point  is  that  joint  production  is  a  technique  of  collection
which  seems  likely  to  be  less  costly  overall  than  the  sum  of  the  costs  of
collecting  separately  the  contribution  information  associated  to  workers  that
chose  different  fund  managers.  In  this  case  the  SSA,  the  IRS  and  Medicare
would  be  using  a  superior  technology  for  collection  as  compared  to  Chilean
AFPs  and  health  insurance  companies.  We  have  not  measured  the  size  of  the
cost  saving  available  through  this  type  joint  production.  Note  that  this  is
different  from  economies  of  scale,  because  it  is  likely  that  joint  collection
may  be  the  most  efficient  technique  regardless  of  the  number  of  workers  at
any  one  employer.  There  is  also  no  presumption  that  collection  is  a  natural
monopoly  if -economies  of  scale  are  exhausted  at  some  reasonable  minimum
efficient  scale.
Note  that  joint  production  does  not  refer  in  this  case  to  the  use  of  a
centralized  payment  system25. The  issue  is  whether  individual  reporting  will
be  checked  jointly  or  not,  and  whether  the  actualization  of  individual  level
data  will  be  made  jointly  or  not.  In  the  conclusions  we  discuss  how  to
organize  joint  collection  in  a  setting  with  multiple  providers  of  pension
services.
24  In  the  case  of  fixed  proportions, the economically appropriate-  cost  allocation is  obtained from
the behavior of  individual outputs as  the sa}e  of  the input changes. At  the optimal  -scale. when
the input increases one unit,  the joint  marginal cost  is equal  to  the sum  of  the prices of  each
output  times the  marginal product of  each  output.
25 Chilean AFPs are already allowed to  use  the banling clearinghouse for  payments.- 42-
S.  Malaysia  and  Zambia
This  section  reports  on  two  other  centralized  state-run  systems,  located
in  Malaysia and  Zambia.
5.1  Malaysia
This  country  established  the  Employee's Provident Fund  (EPF)  in  1951.
This  is  a  state  agency that  manages forced  savings  from  the  workers in  the
formal  sector. The contribution rate  is  20% of  wages.  Another  social  security
institution  is- Malaysia is  SOCSO, which provides disability  pensions  for  low
and  middle  income  workers,  defined  as  those  with  an  income  below  the
equivalent of  803 U.S. dollars per  month.
Benefits
The  EPF pays  a  lump  sum at  age  55,  which is  the  accumulated balance
in  an  individual  account, including  interest.  Therefore,  no  annuities  or  other
periodic  pensions during old  age are  offered by  the EPF. However, at  age 50
the  member  is  also  entitled  to  a  lump  sum  of  33%  of  the  outstanding
balance.  In  addition,  a  member  can  draw  at  any  age  from  the  account
balance  to  purchase  housing.  According  to  the  most  generous  scheme,
affiliates  can  withdraw up  to  40%  of  the  purchase  price  of  a  house  or  the
members'  total  balance,  whichever  is  less,  up  to  a  maximum  of  20,000
Ringgit (8,032 U.S. dollars). There is  no  obligation to returns  She funds to  the
EPF. In  1990, housing withdrawals were 42% of  total withdrawals.
In  case  of  permanent  incapacitation  or  ineligibility  for  old-age  benefit
(e.g.  because of  death),  the EPF  pays back past  contributions plus  interest  in
a lump sum, subject to a maximum close to  12,000 U.S. dollars. In the case of
death  the  EPF  provides  a  type  of  simple  insurance,  because  in  addition  to
the  previously described sum  it  pays  a  second lump  sum  which  is  inversely
related  to  the  age  of  the  deceased  member  and  to  the  number  of  years .of
contribution.  However,  the  formula  is  flawed  in  the  sense  that  it  deviates
from  normal  insurance,  because  the  payment  is  directly  proportional  to  the
account  balance.  The  formula  also  fails  to  take  into  account  the  ages  and
number  of  spouse  and  dependent children.2 6
Independently,  SOCSO  pays  disability  pensions  if  the  contributor  is
deemed incapable  of  earning  one  third  of  the  wages of  a  similarly  qualified
person  because  of  physical  or  mental  incapacity.  To  obtain  a  full  pension
26 The formula for the lump sum is Min (  500;  Max [ 12,000  Individual  account balance x (60
age of death)/( 2  + 3-(Age  at death - age of membership)) ] ),- 43-
(between 50%  and  65%  of  the  average  wage  during  the  36  months  prior  to
the  disability  notice),  at  least  24  contributions  out  of  the  last  40  months
prior  to  the notice of  invalidity are required.  SOCSO also  has  an  employment
injury  scheme  that  applies  to  cases  of  industrial  accidents  and  occupational
disease.  In case  of  total  disability,  this  scheme  pays  pensions of  90%  of  the
average  monthly  wage  during  the  6  months  before  injury  in  respect  to
which  contributions  were  made.  There  is  a  temporary  disability  benefit,  and
an  additional  allowance  in  case  the  injured  persons  needs  constant
attendarnce. Finally,  SOCSO provides  medical care  for  employment injuries  at
nominal  cost.  This  is  not  provided  by  the  pensions  systems  of  the  United
States or Chile.
'In case  of death, SOCSO pays widows 60% of  the total disability pension
and children  share 40% of the  same amount until  age  21.  When the case  of
death is  not  an  employment injury,  survivors  are  not  insured  in  Malaysia.
Coverage
In  199,  the  EPF  had  6.342  million  registered  persons  (members).
According  to  Asher  (1992)  only  51.1%  of  members  contributed  for  at  least
one  month  during  1991,  implying  that  effectively  covered  workers  were
3.239  million in  1991.
At  the  end  of  1990 SOCSO had  4.58  million  members, but  there  is  no
information  about  the  proportion  that  were  covered,  i.e.  the  number  that
met  the  24  month  or  6  month  contribution  requirements  mnentioned above.
We  will  assume  below  that  SOCSO  gave  effective  coverage  to  the  same
number of  active  members at  the  EPF,  that  is  3.239  million  in  1991.  This
would  imply  an  optimistic  ratio  of  insured  to  members  of  70.7%,
substantially larger  than the 51.1%  rate  observed in  the EPF.
Services
The  EPF  offers  a  modest  portfolio  of  pension  services.  It  does  not
provide  invalidity  nor  survivors  insurance.  The  EPF  does  not  pay  periodic
pensions,  so  it  faces  smaller  administrative- costs  than  a  standard  pension
system.  No  poverty-alleviation  pensions  for  the  poor  old  are  administered
by the EPF.
The  most  important  factor  in  the  quality  of  a  pension  is  the  rate  of
return  obtained  by  the  fund,  discounted  by  the  risk  incurred.  In  the  case  of
the EPF, it  is  free  to  credit  a  rate of return  to  members' accounts which may
be  different  from  that  actually  obtained  in  investments.  However,  the  EPF
statute  guarantees  members  a  nominal  rate  of  return  of  2.5%  per  year. - In-44 -
fact  the  EPF  has  declared  a  dividend rate  of  8%  nominal in  the  last  years.
The  following information  is  available:
Table  13
Interest  earned and  credited by  the  Malaysian  EPF
(nominal  %  per  year)
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Rate  of  Retumn  on Investments  (A)  7.76  7.84  8.13  7.47  7.40
Operating  Expenditure/Assets  n.  av.  n.  av.  n.  av.  0.18  0.18
Rate  of  Interest  Credited  8.50  8.50  8.50  8.00  8.00
Nominal  Interest  In  Bank Deposits 8.81  7.17  3.00  n.  av.  4.60
Nominal  Interest  In  Bank Loans  (B) 11.54  10.80  8.19  7.25  7.00
Spread  =  (A)  - (B)  -3.78  -2.96  -0.06  0.22  0.40
CPI  Inflation  0.30  0.70  0.30  2.57  2.80
Real  Intemest Credited  by  EPF  8.18  7.75  8.18  5.30  5.06
Source:  EPF  Annual  Report  1989.  and  Intemnational Financial  Statistics.  lines  601. 60p
and  64.
To  evaluate  the  quality  of  service  to  members  it  is  necessary  to
compare  the  actual  returns  paid  to  members  with  a  benchmark  that  shows
the  returns  available  on  voluntary  investments.  In  Malaysia  bank  interest
rates  have  been  free  since  1981,  so  we  compare  with  bank  lending  rates.
The line  called  spread in  Table  13 shows that  the  EPF was  earning a  sizable
negative  spread.  until  1986,  when  matters  improved  radically  and  the
spread  disappeared.  We  don't  have  information.  on  -performance  for  1992,
when  the  Ringgit  was  devalued,  inflation  picked  up  and  nominal  deposit
rates  recovered,  although  nominal  lending  rates  remained  almost  flat.
A  figure  that  offers  a  glimpse  on  the  quality  of  pensions  produced  by
the  E.PF is  that  its  investment  in  M'alaysian govermecnt securites  was 79.3%
in  199027. On the  other  hand, in  March  1992 the  EPF held  52% of  the  total
debt  of the Federal  Government of Malaysia.  This is  not  surprising, since the
EPF is  required by law  to  hold at  least 70% of its  investmnents  in  government
securities.  In  addition,  the  Minister  of  Finance  designates  4  of  the  7
members  of  the  Investment  Committee.  Foreign  investment  is  banned.  This
suggests  that  the  probability  of  sizable  pensions  being  paid  is  excessively
dependent  of  the  probability  that  Malaysia  will  have  uninterrupted  sound
fiscal  management for  the  next  decades.
2  7  These  percentages  were  84.8%  in  1909 anf 88.1% in  1988.-45 -
In  1989  deposits  with  domestic  banks  and  money  market  instruments
were  7.6%  of  the  investment  portfolio,  while  promissory  notes  plus
debentures  and  guaranteed  loans  to  independent  parties  were  4.1 %.  The  EPF
also  held  1.9%  of  its  portfolio  in  quoted  shares  in  1989  (market  value).
Regarding  affiliated  parties,  0.23%  of  the  investment  portfolio  was  held  in
shares  of  a  subsidiary  of  the  EPF:  the  Malaysia  Building  Society  Berhad,  and
an  additional  1.58%  of  the  portfolio  was  invested  in  a  loan  to  this  same
company.
In  fact,  the  portfolio  management  services  provided  by  the  EPF  are
modest.  In  1989  the  Investment  Panel  met  only  8  times.  There  has  been  an
experiment  of  entrusting  part  of  the  portfolio  to  professional  portfolio
managers,  but  this  part  was  only  0.54%  of  the  portfolio  in  1989.  The
authorities  claim  that  their  performance  after  fees  has  been  modest,  but
apparently  they  are  restricted  to  invest  in  the  domestic  money  market.
Now  consider  other  services.  The  EPF  issues  individual  account
statements  twice  a  year  to  those  that  have  contributed  in  the  last  twelve
months,  while  the  rest  can  obtain  it  only  upon  request.  The  statements  are
sent  in  individual  envelopes  to  the  employers'  location.  The  EPF  also
provides  a  valued  service  by  administering  the  "housing  schemes"
associated  to  it.  As  explained  before,  the  fund  management  services
provided  by  the  EPF  are  very  limited.  The  EPF  has  40  branch  offices  (1992)
and  2,350  employees  (1989).
Costs
The  1990  operating  expenditure  of  the  EPF  was  81.3  million  Ringgit,
and  the  1991  operating  expenditure  was  89  miUion  Ringgit.  In  1990  SOCSO
incurred  an  administrative  cost  of  119.5  million  Ringgit.  Adjusting  the  SQCSO
figure  by  the  Malaysian  inflation  rate  of  4.4%  for  1991,  and  adding  the  EPF
1991  figure  we  get  an  estimate  of  total  administrative  cost  of  77.72  million
U.S.  dollars  for  1991  (the  average  exchange  rate  for  1991  was  2.75  Ringgit
per  US  dollar).  Dividing  this  by  3.239  million  covered  workers  we  obtain  an
average  cost  of  24.0  U.S.  dollars  per year.  This  is  made  up  of  10.0 dollars  for
the EPF and  14.0 dollars for  SOCSO.-. 46 -
In  1989  the  average annual  compensation  of  EPF employees  was  5,7r6
U.S.  dollars2 8. This  was  1.84  times  the  average  annual  covered  wage  of
members, which was 3,108 U.S. dollars in  the same year29.
5.2  Zambia
The main  social security institutions in Zambia are the  following 30:
a)  The  Provident  Fund,  established  in  1966.  It  is  a  mandatory
contribution  system  that  provides  lump-sums  to  registered  persons
('members")  that  meet  conditions  of  age,  retirement,  invalidity  and  to
survivors  of  deceased  members.  It  covers  workers  in  the  private  sector,
parastatals  and  non-pensionable workers  in  the  public  sector.
b) The  Civil  Service Pension  Scheme. This  a  pension  system established
by  the  government  for  its  employees  that  are  in  the  Public  Service,
including the  Teaching Service and the  Defense Forces.
c)  The  Local  Authorities  Superannuation  Fund,  which  covers  senior
employees in  the  local  authorities and  has  only  26,000  members.
d)  Supplementary  Schemes,  established  by  other  employers  that
contribute  also  to  the  Provident Fund.  One  of  them  is  the  Mukuba Pension
Scheme,  established  by  the  Zambia  Consolidated  Copper  Mines  Ltd.  (state
owned).
Coverage
In  the  early  eighties, Zambia's  population  was  estimated  at  6.5  million,
of  which 45%  was in  urban  areas.  The  labor  force  was  1,880,400,  but  only
391,000  were  wage  earners  (Kalula  1985,  page  593).  The  rest  were
independent  workers  in  agriculture  and  in  the  informal  sector,  and  workers
of  agricultural  cooperatives.  In  1989  the  population  estimate  was  adjusted
to  8  million,  and  the  formal  sector  workers to  360,000. Life  expectancy was
adjusted to 57.5  years in the  1990 census  (ISSA 1990, p.  61).
28  Accordingto the  EPF  Annual Report, in  1989 the  wage bill  was MS 29.144  minlion and total
personnel was  2,149.
29 In  1989 total collection was MS 3,566 million, coming from 2.660 million active members, while
contribution rates  were  10% on  the  employer and  10% on  the employee. Average compensation
was adjusted by  the variation of  the consamer price index until March 1992. as  reported in  the
IFS (1 have only up to January. the variation was 8.74%, check this).
30 ISSA (1990), pages  66-67.- 47-
The  National  Provident  Fund  reports  only  the  number  of  members,  i.e.
persons  that  contributed  at  least  once  This  was  1,078,914  members  as  of
March  1982  and  1,099,778  as  of  March  1988  (including  the  deceased  in
both  numbers).  The  absence  of  growth  is  notable  in  the  face  of  labor
turnover  between  the  covered  and  uncovered  workers  population  changes,
but  it  may  be  related  to  the  problems  with  individual  accounts.  The  number
of  contributors in  a  given month or  in  a  given year  was unknown. The only
keported figure  is  about  contributing  employers,  which  were  close  to  10,000
throughout  the  1980s  (live  accounts)3 . Although  we  know  that  about  10%
of  employers were  from  the public  sector,  there  is  no- information  about  the
shae  of  members  that  worked  in  the  public  sector.  The  heavy  involvement
of  the  state  in  production  in  Zambia  suggests  that  a  large  share  were
employees  of  parastatals.
The  law  allows  some .workers  not  to  contribute  to  the  provident  Fund.
These  are  casual  workers  (  those  that  work  for  less  than  one  month),  the
self-employed,  worker in  cooperatives  and  domestic  servants  in  rural  areas.
They  can  all  become  members  voluntarily,  but  there  -are  no  statistics
regarding  this.
On  the  other  hand,  the  annual  reports  insist  that  compliance  was
deficient;  'As  highlighted  in  the  previous  report,  shortage  of  transport
adversely  affected  the  mobility  of  inspectors.  Consequently,  the  level  of
compliance  was  not  as  high  as  expected...  During  the  year,  the  Board
experienced  a  critical  shortage  of  transport,  especially  at  Read  Office  and
stations  along  the  line  of  rail.  This  shortage  resulted  in  hindering  the
running  of  operations.  Consequently,, the  Board  had  to  make  do  with  the
available  obsolete  vehicles  in  which  it  spent  huge  amounts  of.  money  on
maintenance  and  repairs."  32
Another  dimension  of  coverage  is  related  to  the  maximum earnings  for
contribution purposes.  Over  the  1980's, it  evolved  from  200  to  500  to  3,000
Kwacha  per  month  as  a  response  to  inflation.  We  have  exchange  rates  for
the  last two  of  these limits,  which meant that  the limit  was 51.8  U.S. dollars
per  month in  1990 and  62.4  U.S. dollars  per  month in  1991. From  another
point  of  view,  in  1982183  the  percentage  of  contributions  that  were
calculated  on  a  wage  above  200  kwacha  was  33.7%,  but  that  rose  only  to
37.6%  as  of  year  1988/89. In  light  of  inflationary  trends,  this  suggests  that
under  reporting  of  salaries  became  massive  in  the  private  sector  that  was
covered,  and/or  that  real  wages  fell  dramatically  in  the  parastatal  sector.
31i Souces: 17th Anmnual  Report. page 9  and 22nd Annual Report, page S.
32  Zambia  National  Provident Fund  Board,  22nd  Annual  Report  1987188, pages  7  and  8.-48-
Services
The  contribution rate  to  the  Provident Fund  is  10%, of  which  different
parts  are  paid  in  the  name  of  worker and  employer  depending of  the  level
of  reported  income. The  Provident Fund  offers  the  following  benefits  to  its
members:
a)  A  lump-sum  when  attaining  age  55  or  when  attaining  age  50
provided  the  worker  retires.  Retirement into  self-employment  is  acceptable.
For  those  who joined  the  Fund  before April  1,  1973, the  same  benefits  are
available  at  ages  50  and  45.  The  age/benefit  structure  shows  that  the
financing system is  partly  pay-as-you-go, and  is  not  fully  funded.
The  lump  sum  is  the  value  of  past  contributions,  plus  credited  interest.
Credited interest  is  decided  each  year  in  advance  of  actual  returns,  so  there
is  a  defined-benefit or  averaging  concept behind  the  benefit  formula.  Actual
investment  returns  may  be  different  from  credited  interest  for  prolonged
periods,  with  the  difference  being  made  up  by  growing  reserves  or  by
phantom  assets.
Upon  old  age  or  retirement,  the  worker may  choose  an  annuity  rather
than  a  lump  sum,  but  according  to  the  financial  figures  most  preferred  the
lump  sum.
b)  Invalidity  benefit  is  offered  to  members  that.  have  permanent
incapacity for any work due  to physical or mental disability. . It  consists of a
lump  sum  equal  to  total  accumulated  contributions  plus  interest.  It  should
be  realized  that  this  formula  doesn't  provide  insurance,  which  would  pay
more to  those  invalids that  are  younger, because they  have  lost  the  eamings
of  more years.
c)  Survivor  Benefit,  paid  to  nominated  spouse  or  other  dependent
relatives  if  death occurs  before otherwise payable. It  is  a  lump sum  equal  to
total  accumulated contributions plus  interest.  Again,  this  is  not  insurance.
d)  Funeral  Grant  of  120  Kwacha if  at  least  24  contributions  have been
credited.
e)  Maternity  benefit  of  100  Kwacha  for  each  birth,  for  those  female
members that  have  24  contributions  to  the fund.  This  is  a  cross  subsidy,  as
the  benefit  is  not  deducted  from  the member's account.-49.
Organization
The  Provident Fund is  governed by  a  Board with  16  members, of  which
five  represent  employers'  associations  (in  turn  dominated  by  parastatals,  i.e.
by  the  government),  five  represent  employees'  associations  and  six  are
named  by  the  government.
Indicators  of  quality
The  two  main  aspects  of  quality  are  the  risk-adjusted  rate  of  return
obtained  by  members and  the  quality  of  services.  Regarding the  first  issue,
the  law  fixes  -the  composition  of  the  Investment  Committee,  which  has
exclusive  responsibility  for  allocating  investments,  of  which  five  are  named
by  the  government  and  two  are  persons  nominated  by  the  Minister
responsible  for  Labor  to  represent  employers'  associations  and  the  other  to
represent  employees'  associations33. Regarding  the  outcome,  the  following
table  is  illustrative.
Table  14
Investnment  Income  earned  by  the  Zambia  National  Provident  Fund
(Million  Kwacha  of  each  year.  %)
year  Investment  Assets  Rate  Interest  Credited  Rate  of  In'Blation  Real
Income  of  return  to  members  Interest  rate  (CPI)  Return
1983  26.317  n.ay.  a.  av.  19.618  5.5 %  19.5 %  -11.7  %
1984  30.967  385.985  8.0 %  22.571  5.5 %  20.1  %  -12.2  %
1988  8.592  786.168  11.0 %  39.748  5.5 %  54.7%  -31.8  %
1989  97.162  803.750  12.1 %  37.040  5.5 No  128.7 %  -53.9  %
Source:  Annual  Reports  of  the  Zambia  National  Provident  Fund  Board  for  82/83.  83184.
87/88  and  88189.  CPI  Inflation  obtained  from  International  Financial  Statistics,  as  the
CPI  level  of  the  year  divided  by  the  CPI  level  of  the  previous  year.  The  real  return  to
members  was  calculated  as  [(1+  nominal  return)/(1+  inflation)]  - 1.
The  rate  of  return  have  been  negative  in  the  whole  financial  system  in
Zambia,  but  the  Provident  Fund  has  done  significantly  worse  than  bank
deposits.  If  the  portfolio  had  included  domestic  real  estate  and  some  foreign
33  Articles 33 and  32 (2) in  the Providen  Fund Act-- 50-
investments,  returns  would  have  been  much  higher.  The  spread  used  by  the
Provident  Fund  to  pay  its  administrative  expenses  grew  to  6.6  percentage
points  per  year,  as  the  real  value  of  the  fund  it  manages  was  eroded  by
inflation.
Another  aspect  of  quality  is  related  to  efforts  to  improve  the  allocation
of  investment.  However,  in  the  provident  fund  investment  decisions  are
very  infrequent.  For  example,  in  1988/89  the  Investment  Committee
approved  just  eleven  investments,  the  largest  of  which  were  loans  to  the
government.  In  the  year  ending  in  1988,  60.4  %  of  the  portfolio  was
invested  in  government  stocks,  loans  to  the  government  and  loans  to
parastatals.  11.2%  was  invested  in  real  estate,  including  that  used  by  the
Provident  Fund  administration.  22.1  %  was  invested  in  bank  deposits,  a
share  of  which  are  state-owned.
Regarding the  quality  of  service,  the  available  information  suggests  it  is
low.  For  example,  the  Annual  Reports  indicate  that  only  a  share  of  the
requests  for  indivlidual  statements  of  accounts  are  processed  and  issued.
Specifically,  in  the  year  ending  in  March  1988,  13,280  requests  were
received  but  only  82% were  processed and issued  (page 7).
Cost
The  accounting  in  the  Zambia  National  Provident  Fund  is  audited
annually by  external  auditors,  so  it  is  quite  reliable.  The  only  aspect  that- is
not  treated  convincingly  is  the  imputed  rent  earned  By  the  find  on
buildings  it  has  let  the  Zambia  National  Provident  Fund  Board  (the  fund
manager).  It  is  notable  that  the  imputed  rent  has  been  constant  fixed  in
nominal  terms  throughout  the  1980's,  even  though  the  country  experienced
substantial  inflation.
The  costs  reported  below  refer  to  services  rendered  during  the  active
life  of  the  worker.  There are  no  services offered in  the  passive phase  of  life
because old-age  benefits are  paid  as  lump  sums.51  .
Table  15
Administrative  Expense  In  the  Zambia  National  Provident Fund
(Million  Kwacha  of  each  year)
year  Administr.  Contribution  Revnue  Am.  Expense  Cast  per  formal worker*
ending  Expense  (M.Kw.)  (M.U.S.  S)  Covered  Wage  Kwachaty.  US  Sty.**
1983  11.008  50.267  54.2  2.19 %  30.6  46.5
1984  13.303  53.709  42.9  2.48  %  37.0  47.1
1988  53.614  123.800  13.9  4.33  %  148.9  33.2
1989  66.685  128.900  15.7  5.17 %  185.2  18.0
:  Obtained by dividing reported costs by the number of  formal sector workers, which wa  360.000
in  1989 (ISSA. 1990 p. 61).
**: The dollar figure is  obtained in  a  way that excludes the effects of changes jr  the Zambian real
exchange rate. All  Kwacha figures are taken to  1982 using the Zambian CPL. then the exchange rate
for  that  year is  used to  convert into U.S.  dollars, and  the  resulting dollar figure is  taken to  1991
using  U.S.  CPI  inflation. The  Zambian CPI  used  is  that  reported  in  the  International  Financial
Statistics for  the previous calendar year, because thd reported year ends in  March 31 of  each year.
Source: Annual Reports of  the  Zambia National Provident Fund Board for  82/83. 83J84, 87AS and
58189.
We  consider  the  average  of  1983  and  1984  to  be  more  representative
of  steady-state  costs,. as  the  foreign  exchange  shortages  of  the  latter  period
many of the  normal activities to  a  stop.
We  find  that  although  annual  costs  per  worker  are  bot  large  in  real
terms,  they  represent  an  unusually  large  fraction  of  contribution  revenue.
This  suggests  that  the  administrative  cost  of  providing  pension  services
should  not  be  assumed  to  be  a  proportion  of  wages  or  of  contributions  in
international  comparisons.
Cost  structure
In  the  year  ending  in  March  1988,  the  expenditure  of  the  Provident
Fund was allocated  as follows:
-% of  expenses
a)  Salaries  and  Allowances  44.1
b)  Other  staff  costs  (canteen,  sports,  staff  pensions.  others)  3.7
c)  Rents  paid  to  third  parties  5.7
d)  Rents:  Internal  charge  2.0
c)  Traveling  &  Motor  vehicle  expenses  11.0
f)  Data  processing  hire  2.7
g)  Postage,  telephone.  stationary,  printing  14.4
h)  Insurance  4.1
i)  Depreciation  8.6
j)  Other  3.7- 52 
It  is  remarkable  how  the  cost  structure  is  much  less  intensive  in
salaries than in  similar government agencies in  the OECD.
The  Provident  Fund  had  27  offices  around  the  country  and  a  staff  of
1,492 in  March  1988.  On  the  basis  of  the  reported  figure  for  salaries,  but
excluding  other  personnel-related  costs3 4,  the  average  salary  at  the
Provident Fund  was  1,322 Kwacha  per  month  during  that  financial  year.  If
the  number  of  contributors  were  equal  to  the  360,000  people  employed  for
a  wage,  this  salary  would be  4.6  times  the  average  taxable  salary  on  which
contributions  were  based.  This  is  in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  maximum
taxable salary  is  relatively  small in  Zambia.
6.  Concluding  Comments
The  evidence  in  this  paper  shows  that  the  differences  in  the  quality  of
service  between  pension  systems  are  as  large  as  the  difference  between
administrative  charges.  State-run  pension  systems  appear  as  providing
inferior  services  - the  case  of  Zambia  is  most  dramatic  - but  they  are
cheaper also.  The  following table  summarizes our  cost  findings.
Table  16
Summary  of Charges or Costs
(U.S.  dollars  of  1992  per  covered  person  per  year  of  active  life)
Country  and  System  Active  Inval.  &  Surv.  Passive  Total
Life  Insurance  Life  Life  Cost
Chile:
a) AFPs  51.6  6.7  Not.  av.
b)  Life  Ins.  Companies  - - 30.8
United  States:
a)  Employer  DC  Plans  46.7  - -
b)  Employer  DB  Plans  see  total  see  total  see  total  187.3
c)  Life  Ins.  Companies
i) Group  - - 130.9
ii)  Individual  - - 320.9
d)  Social  Security  Not  av.  5.7  15.1
Malaysia:
a)  EPF  10.0  - - Incomplete
b) SOCO  - 14.0  - Incomplete
Zambia:
Provident  Fund  46.8  - - Incomplete
Incomplete  means  that  full  life  coverage  is  not  offered  by  the  system.
34 The costs of  canteen. sports clubs (including tennis and golf) and interest on  staff pension fund
wac together  8.4 % of salaries  and anlowances  in the year ending in Mbarch  1988.53
An important  conclusion is that the charges  in private  annuity  markets
are very  considerable,  confirming  the results  of Friedman  and Washawsky
(1990).  Even  in the  case  of group  annuities,  the  cost  to the  user  in the
United  States is 8.6 times  the cost of state-run  annuities.  This is a within-
country  comparison, not  subject  to the biases  in international  comparisons.
On the  other  hand,  charges  for  the  active-life  portion  of pension  services
seem to be  more similar across private  and public providers.
The difference  in quality  between  public  and  private  annuities  is an
obvious  candidate  to explain  this  difference.  It  is instructive  to ask why
large  employers  in  the  United  States  have  never  sought  to contract  out
pension  administration  with  the  Social Security  Administration,  to  take
advantage  of its  low  costs.  This  is  a relevant  question,  considering  that
federal  pensions  are  adjusted  by  the  CPI, so they  offer  better  protection
than  private  annuities  in  case  of  inflation.  This  could  mean  that  an
employer  pays  the SSA a single  premium  for  each  employee  that  retires,
the SSA spends  the funds  immediately  paying  benefits  to others,  and the
SSA  guarantees  the- payment  of the associated  benefits  out of future  taxes,
subject  to future  Congressional changes to the  amount  of the benefits.  This
description  suggests  one  possible  answer:  many  US employers  prefer  to
absorb  the charges  associated  to the purchase  of annuities  in order  to have
them  funded  and protected  by contract law.
Chilean  annuities  are  also  expensive.  Although  the  cost  of  private
annuities  appears  much lower  for  Chile in  Table  16, an  adjustment  for
differences  in incomes shows that  the Chilean cost would be USS 187.4 per
year  of active  life if US incomes  applied  in  Chile, higher  than  the  cost of
group  annuities  in  the  U.SI. On the  other  hand,  as private  annuities  are
indexed  to the  CPI in  the  Chilean case, the  difference  in  quality  is even
more obvious. Note that  the  improvement  in quality  due to CPI indexing is
not  a feature  of the  insurance  industry  itself, but  is a consequence  of the
existence  of issuers  of CPI-indexed debt.
The high  charges  for  the  guarantees  embedded  in  private  annuities
suggest  that  products  with  fewer  guarantees  might  be  substantially
cheaper.  For example, one can imagine  a variable  annuity  - where  most of
the  investment  risk  is borne  by the  pensioner  - invested  mostly  in fixed
income securities, plus an adjustment  for deviations  between  projected  and
actual  mortality  --so the risk of errors  in the life table  are borne  mostly by
pensioners.  This would  be  quite  similar to the  phased  withdrawal  used in
1 The ratio of average covered incomes is 18,441 /  (0.777x325x12) - 18.441/3.030  -
6.086 times.54
Chile plus  longevity  insurance.  Another  advantage  is  that  it  produces
relatively  inflation-proof  benefits  when  invested  in nominal  debt  of short
maturity,  even  in countries  where  CPI-indexed  debt  is not  abundant.  The
design  of  cheap  retirement  prooucts  liked  this  one  seems  to  be  an
attractive  path for privately-managed  pension systems.
We  have  found  that  international  comparisons  of  the  collection
function  are  mired  by  problems  of  allocation  of joint  costs.  In  Zambia,
Malaysia  and  Chile the  pension  system  must  collect  contributions  on  its
own. In the United States, the Social Security Administration  piggybacks on
the  income  tax collection  system  (IRS). The  possibility  of joint  collection
suggests  that  the  mandatory  pension  system  can  be  used  as  a base  for
organizing  other  services,  such  as  mandatory  health  contributions  and
widely  based  income  taxes  at  a  low  marginal  cost.  This  sort  of
infrastructure  may yield significant benefits  in other  areas of the -economy,
if organized  efficiently.  Those benefits  should  be credited  to the operating
income of the administrative  entity  of the  pension system,  or equivalently
the cost  allocation for the  pension  portion  must  be substantially  less than
100  %  of joint costs.
An  interesting  question  is  whether  private  provision  of  pension
services  can coexist with  joint collection, in the  sense  that  each employer
faces just  one collection agency.  [f this were  possible, then  admini3trative
charges  in  competitive  privately-managed  pension  systems  could  be
reduced.  The  answer  is  that  for-profit  fund  managers  have  a  direct
incentive  to come together  and  hire  an agent  to do joifit4y their  collection
from  any one employer, because  it reduces  costs.
.In  the  case  of  Chile,  other  distortions  have  prevented  this  from
happening.  Chilean AFPs are  allowed  to organize  collection  as they  wish,
but  the  attempts  to centralize  collection have  failed. The reason  appears  to
be that,  due to misalignments  between  the commission and cost structures,
the  information  about  who  contributes  what  is  privately  very  valuable.
This information  is so valuable  that  AFPs prefer  to incur  higher  collection
costs  rather  than  sharing  information.  This seems  to be  specially  true  for
the largest  AFPs, who already  enjoy to some degree  the advantages  of joint
collection, so the savings  for them  are smaller.  It is expected  that  as Chile
attacks  the sources of this other  distortion, the incentives  will shift to favor
joint  collection,  including  also  mandatory  health  insurance  and  income
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